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I. INTRODUCTION
Complaints about the legal profession’s self-regulation abound. 
Clients and critics argue, often persuasively, that the rules of 
professional conduct systematically favor lawyers’ interests over clients’ 
and societal interests,1 that the rules are chronically underenforced,2 and 
that enforcement, if and when it does take place, tends to be too lenient.3 
1. Examples of rules favoring lawyers’ interests include American Bar Association 
(ABA) Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(5), the so-called self-defense 
exception to confidentiality allowing lawyers to reveal confidential client information in 
order to defend against allegations of wrongdoing and collect their fees; Model Rule 5.5
prohibiting nonlawyers from practicing law and providing the legal profession a 
monopoly over the provision of legal services; and Model Rule 6.1, recommending but 
not requiring the provision of pro bono legal services.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5), 5.5, 6.1 (2010).  A recent example is ABA Formal Opinion 09-
455, Disclosure of Conflicts Information When Lawyers Move Between Law Firms, in 
which another exception to confidentiality was recognized to make attorney lateral 
moves easier. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-455
(2009) (on file with author); see Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving 
the Tension Between Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary Lawyers’ Career 
Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 227–28, 233, 272–77 (2007) (advocating a solution to the 
tension between confidentiality and conflict rules that does not come at clients’ expense).
2. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 648 (1981) (“[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of
professional conduct are not enforced.”); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 493 (1990) (noting rules of professional conduct tend to be
“systematically underenforced”).
3. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of 
the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 465 (2008) (“The enforcement of the Rules 
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Lawyers, understandably and self-servingly generally defenders of self-
regulation,4 also complain about the rules of professional conduct, 
asserting that the rules are antiquated and often out of touch with 
practice realities.5 
Nowhere is lawyers’ own critique of the rules more compelling than in
the context of the nationalization and globalization of the practice of 
law.  Although technological advances continue to flatten our world;6 
clients’ needs increasingly span jurisdictional, regional, and national
borders7; large law firms become national, even global entities;8 and 
outsourcing and off-shoring legal services become a reality,9 still, the 
regulation of the legal profession continues to be state based.10  States
and the Public Interest, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2002) (citing examples of lax
lawyer discipline).
4. This is not to suggest that the legal profession is a monolith with uniform and 
consistent interests.  Although most lawyers favor self-regulation because it serves their
interests disallowing competition by nonlawyers, disagreement abounds regarding other
aspects of the organized bar’s implementation of self-regulation. Solo practitioners and
small law firms have long complained, not without merit, that the rules are promulgated
and enforced with a bias against them and in favor of large law firms and their lawyers.
See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1111 n.355 (2004) (discussing discriminatory enforcement 
against solo practitioners).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 153, 158 (2000) (“The Model Rules are antiquated.  Facetiously put, they were
designed for a handful of ethnically-compatible gentlemen practicing in the small town 
not within a hundred miles of an ocean and with a view of the river.  They do not 
work.”). 
6. Jack P. Sahl, Foreword: The New Era—Quo Vadis?, 43 AKRON L. REV. 641,
642 n.2 (2010); Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat: Globalization and Its Effect on 
Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527, 531–47 
(2008). 
7. See, e.g., Anthony E. Davis, Regulation of the Legal Profession in the United 
States and the Future of Global Law Practice, 19 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2009 at 1, 8–11. 
8. James R. Faulconbridge et al., Global Law Firms: Globalization and 
Organizational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 455– 
59 (2008); Carole Silver et al., Between Diffusion and Distinctiveness in Globalization: 
U.S. Law Firms Go Glocal, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1438–45 (2009). 
9. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous 
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2139, 
2166–67 (2010).
10. The ABA Commission on Legal Ethics 20/20 is examining the impact 
of globalization and technology on the legal profession.  Among other issues,
the commission is looking into liberalizing national and some aspects of global law 
practice.  To date, the commission has released issues papers on the ability of foreign
lawyers to practice law in the United States, see AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON ETHICS
20/20, MEMORANDA AND TEMPLATES FOR COMMENT—INBOUND FOREIGN LAWYERS ISSUES 




















   
   
   
 




   
 
   
 
     
administer varying admission standards, generally restrict the practice of
law within their jurisdictions to lawyers licensed in the state, promulgate
state rules of professional conduct, and enforce discipline at the state 
level, rendering self-regulation outdated and increasingly inconsistent
with practice realities.
Strikingly, although many recent scholarly contributions have begun 
to explore the meaning and consequences of the globalization of law 
practice,11 precious little has been done about a perhaps less sexy but
nevertheless more immediate and pressing development—the
nationalization of law practice.12  The goal of this Article is to address 
this scholarly oversight, advocating the partial nationalization of the
regulatory approach to law practice.  It analyzes the ongoing nationalization 
and globalization of law practice exploring its causes and effects, argues
that the current state-based approach to the regulation of the legal
profession ill fits the new landscape of law practice, and studies several
approaches to responding to the nationalization of law practice. 
At one end, the profession can adhere to the status quo and continue to 
self-regulate at the state level.  This approach may be warranted if—the
growing gap with practice realities notwithstanding—there are compelling 
reasons to retain the current state-based regulatory apparatus.
Establishing that such reasons do not exist, the Article examines an
approach at the other end, nationalizing the regulatory approach to law 
practice.  This approach would entail nationalized admission standards, a
nationalized licensing scheme, a national code of ethics, and national 
enforcement; practically speaking, this approach would be achieved by
federalizing regulation, thus significantly altering and arguably
gov/ConfHandout/2011StephenGillersABA4.pdf, on the ABA Model Rule on Admission by
Motion, see AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER 
CONCERNING THE ABA RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (2010) [hereinafter ADMISSION 
BY MOTION], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
ethics_2020/admission_motion.authcheckdam.pdf, and on multijurisdictional practice, 
see AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER 
CONCERNING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (2011) [hereinafter MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
PRACTICE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 
_2020/ mjp_issues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf. 
11. Sahl, supra note 6, at 653–54, 656–61; International Legal Ethics Conference
IV: The Legal Profession in Times of Turbulence, held by the Stanford Center on the 
Legal Profession and the American Bar Association for Professional Responsibility (July
15–17, 2010), available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/ilec4/. 
12. See infra Part II.  Revealingly, in a recent essay assessing a 2002 amendment 
to ABA Model Rule 5.5 governing multijurisdictional practice, Arthur Greenbaum notes 
that although the amendment promoted uniformity across states and was the product of 
compromises, it did not even strive, let alone succeed, in promulgating the “best” rule 
regarding national law practice. Arthur F. Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the 
Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5—An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON 
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weakening self-regulation,13 and shifting regulatory power from the 
states to the federal government.  Concluding that such a dramatic
regulatory reform is not yet warranted either conceptually or by
empirical findings regarding the extent of national law practice, the 
Article advocates a third, intermediary approach: retaining the current 
state-based admissions, licensing, and disciplinary apparatus, while 
adopting an open-border national jurisdiction for purposes of lawyers’
authorized law practice.  This intermediary approach to nationalizing 
law practice addresses pressing client needs ignored by the current state-
based approach while respecting longstanding arguments supporting the 
ability of states to regulate law practice and arguments favoring self-
regulation over the federalization of the practice of law. 
To date, the best case for nationalizing law practice is a 1994 article 
by Professor Fred Zacharias, entitled Federalizing Legal Ethics, a paper 
that, ironically, falls short of actually calling for the nationalization of 
law practice and only calls for the nationalization, via federalization, of
legal ethics rules.14  Zacharias’s argument for federalizing legal ethics
consists of four analytical steps.  First, significant ongoing changes in
the practice of law bring about the nationalization of law practice. 
Second, the nationalization of law practice renders the current legal 
ethics rules ineffective15 because legal ethics rules are promulgated and 
enforced at the state level and vary from state to state, and lawyers who
increasingly have a national practice find themselves subject to the
conflicting regulation of several jurisdictions.16  Third, the growing 
mismatch between the national practice of law and the state-based
regulation of lawyers can only be resolved by nationalizing legal ethics 
and putting in place a uniform set of rules of practice.17  Finally, 
practically speaking, the only workable avenue of nationalizing legal 
ethics is federalization.18 
13. By replacing state-based regulation, promulgated and enforced by judges and
lawyers, with federal regulation, promulgated by Congress and enforced by a federal
administrative agency. 
14. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 345 (1994). 
The article also explores briefly nationalizing, by federalizing, enforcement of legal 
ethics rules.  It does not, however, deal with admissions standards and multijurisdictional
practice.
15. “The changes in professional regulation and in the nature of legal practice have
contributed to a sense that current [ethics] codes may no longer be effective.”  Id. at 344. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 















   
  
  
     







This Article is organized as a response to Zaharias’s influential paper, 
revisiting each of his four analytical steps.  Following Zacharias, Part II
documents the growing nationalization and globalization of law practice, 
and argues that the transformation of law practice renders the state-based
regulation of lawyers ineffective.  Part III parts ways with Zacharias’s 
thesis.  It asserts that nationalizing, by federalizing, legal ethics is not
warranted by changing practice realities and that, worse, federalizing the 
rules of legal ethics without more will leave some of the most troubling 
aspects of the transformation of law practice, including client needs,
unaddressed.  Instead, Part III argues that the growing nationalization of 
law practice on the ground requires nationalizing the regulatory
approach to law practice and offers a blueprint for such reform.  In other 
words, it concludes that although Federalizing Legal Ethics may not
have succeeded in compellingly justifying a need to federalize the rules 
of professional conduct, it accomplished a far much more ambitious 
agenda—laying a foundation for the nationalization of law practice.19 
Finally, Part IV briefly explores some of the implications of nationalizing
the regulatory approach to law practice in the context of the increased
globalization of law practice. 
II. THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL LAW PRACTICE AND 
STATE-BASED REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
A.  National Law Practice 
The practice of law is increasingly national in nature.  Writing in 
1994, Professor Zacharias observed: 
To service increasingly mobile individual clients and national commercial clients, 
lawyers and firms have broadened their practices.  Most major firms maintain 
branch offices in several states.  Virtually all lawyers have become accustomed
to representing clients in multistate transactions and litigation.  Lawyers no
longer can afford to confine their activities to local courts, because the expansion of
federal jurisdiction and administrative regulation create the possibility that
almost any matter will become subject to federal law . . . .  Conversely, servicing 
clients in more routine matters requires local lawyers to offer advice and
representation that cross state lines.  The practices of both multistate law firms 
and less ambitious practitioners thus have become national in nature.20 
Since 1994, the causes and processes nationalizing law practice have 
significantly intensified.  To begin with, client needs have dictated 
an expansion in cross-state practices as client interests increasingly span
19. See also Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (1991) (predicting the adoption of a “Federal Code of
Lawyering”).
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state jurisdictional borders.21  For example, a client domiciled and doing 
business in state A may be negotiating with counterparties, lenders, 
suppliers, creditors, and clients in states B, C, D, E, and F, and agreeing
to arbitrate or litigate subject to the laws of state G.  Such a client will
need legal advice about the law and its application in several states, may
need a lawyer to negotiate on its behalf out of state A, and may
subsequently need legal representation out of state.  Or a national entity 
client may be doing business in multiple states, therefore requiring legal
advice on the law of several states in multiple areas and representation in 
multiple jurisdictions where it may sue and get sued regularly. 
Next, federal law has continued to expand significantly and with it, 
lawyers practicing federal law irrespective of state borders.22  Moreover,
state law claims related to federal law further blur jurisdictional lines 
and expand the scope of national law practice.  For example, an illegal
immigrant client seeking representation in conjunction with deportation
proceedings may have at the same time claims for unpaid wages,
triggering additional bodies of federal law and state law.23 
At the same time as increased client demand and growth in federal law
have expanded the scope of national law practice, technological 
advances have revolutionized the practice of law, making it much easier
to practice law nationally, from research tools that make studying law 
and gaining competence nationally quick, easy, and relatively cheap, to 
advances that allow lawyers to be virtually present everywhere.24  These 
21. Helen W. Gunnarsson, A Proposed Makeover for the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 96 ILL. B.J. 128, 129 (2008); Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal
Practice, 42 INT’L LAW. 833, 833–34 (2008); Raymond J. Werner, Licensed in One State, 
but Practicing in Another: Multijurisdictional Practice, PROB. & PROP., Mar.–Apr. 2003, 
at 6, 9. 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(2) (2010) (generally allowing 
out-of-state lawyers to practice federal law); see Cynthia L. Fountaine, Have License,
Will Travel: An Analysis of the New ABA Multijurisdictional Practice Rules, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 737, 743–55 (2003) (explaining rule 5.5’s approach and rationale); see also
Mark Pruner, The Internet and the Practice of Law, 19 PACE L. REV. 69, 79–80 (1998) 
(“The licensing of lawyers for most purposes is regulated at the state level.  Some
practice areas that primarily involve federal laws have federal licensing requirements.
Areas such as federal tax law and patent law have separate licensing laws, so lawyers can
practice their ‘federal’ specialty without being licensed in the state where they have an
office.”).
23. See, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don’t Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding 
Undocumented Workers’ Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355, 383–85 
(2008). 
24. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949











    
 
      
   
    
        
    
  
 
   
      
 
 





   
      
    
     
    
 
  
    
advances have made national law practice feasible and accessible to
clients and lawyers alike. 
Increased supply followed the growing demand for national legal 
services, evidenced by the significant expansion in the number and size 
of large law firms25—a prime example of providers of legal services on a
national level26—as well as of franchise law firms.27  Indeed, the practice
of law is increasingly becoming not only national but even global. 
Global law firms are growing in number and size,28 alliances between 
law firms across the globe abound,29 outsourcing and offshoring legal
services are expanding,30 even global law schools emerge.31  In turn, the
nationalization and globalization of law practice create and sustain new 
career paths for lawyers, which increasingly include increased
mobility.32 
State Bar, 2005 Formal Ethics Op. 10 (2006), reprinted in N.C STATE BAR, THE 2006 
LAWYER’S HANDBOOK 318 (2006), available at 2006 WL 980309 (same); see also
Thomas D. Morgan, Conflicts of Interest and the New Forms of Professional
Associations, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 242 (1998) (foreseeing the advent of virtual law
firms); J. Clayton Athey, Note, The Ethics of Attorney Web Sites: Updating the Model 
Rules To Better Deal with Emerging Technologies, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 499, 508 
(2000); see generally J.T. Westermeier, Ethics and the Internet, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
267 (2004). 
25. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second 
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1882–84 (2008); see also
MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 112–13 (1991). 
26. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 341–42. 
27. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1485, 1491 n.19 (2009).  But see Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for 
Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 723 (2001) (“The franchise law firm
movement appears to be facing serious financial difficulties: Jacoby & Meyers has 
dissolved and Hyatt Legal Services has shrunk dramatically.  Many other so-called legal 
clinics have decided to concentrate almost exclusively on personal injury work” (footnotes
omitted)).  See generally JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF PERSONAL LEGAL SERVICES (1997) (discussing the growth of franchise law firms and 
arguing that such firms mass market and produce services at low cost, but at the expense
of quality).
28. See articles cited supra note 8. 
29. John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in 
International Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 56 (2007);
John Flood & Fabian Sosa, Lawyers, Law Firms, and the Stabilization of Transnational 
Business, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 489, 506–13 (2008); Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great 
Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2059 (2010). 
30. See, e.g., Regan & Heenan, supra note 9, at 2139, 2166–67. 
31. See, e.g., JINDAL GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL, http://www.jgls.org/jg_default.aspx? 
this=3 (last visited Apr. 24, 2011); see also Joseph Weiler, Remarks, The Globalization
of the American Law School, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 189, 189–92 (2007). 
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The nationalization of the practice of law is perhaps most visible in 
the practice of large law firms representing large entity clients.33   A
national entity client, let alone an international client, may have legal
needs in multiple jurisdictions and may have legal issues that span
across jurisdictions.  Its representation might thus inherently entail 
practice across state lines and cooperation among firm lawyers in
multiple offices nationwide and worldwide.34  Yet it is important to note
that the national practice of law is not merely the domain of national law 
firms servicing national clients.  To service increasingly mobile 
individual clients, lawyers and firms of all sizes have broadened their
practices.35  Indeed, servicing clients even in “routine matters requires
local lawyers to offer advice and representation that cross state lines. 
The practices of both multistate law firms and less ambitious 
practitioners thus have become national in nature.”36 
It is noteworthy, however, that although there is a general consensus 
that the practice of law is becoming more national and global37—as well 
as indirect indicia of growing national law practice such as the rise in the
number and size of national law firms—there is little empirical evidence 
systematically quantifying the various aspects of the nationalization and 
globalization of law practice.38  We have little information about how
33. On the separation of hemispheres in law practice, whereby large law firms tend 
to service large entity clients and solo and small law firms commonly serve individual
clients, see JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20 (1982), which coins the classic term “hemispheres” of
lawyers to denote that the legal profession consists of two categories of lawyers whose 
practice settings, socioeconomic and ethno-religious backgrounds, education, and 
clientele differ considerably.
34. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 352 (“When national lawyers represent or sue 
national corporations, the problems are exacerbated.  A firm that has several members
representing a corporation may find an issue simultaneously governed by the codes in (1) 
the state in which the firm’s lawyers communicate with the corporation (e.g., the firm’s
headquarters); (2) the home states of the lawyers representing the corporation; (3) the 
home state of the corporation; and (4) the state in which the legal issue arises.”).
35. See Duncan T. O’Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical 
Obligations, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 678, 678 (1986) (attributing the increase in
multistate practice to the increased mobility of lawyers and clients, the interstate scope of
many business transactions, the growth of specialization, and the pervasiveness of
federal law). 
36. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 342–43. 
37. Sahl, supra note 6, at 645. 
38. Id. at 645–46; see also Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us: The 
Need for Empirical Research in Regulating Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global 
Economy, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1009, 1016 n.19 (2010) (“This debate [over 
multijurisdictional practice] is difficult to resolve, in large part, because of the absence of 
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many lawyers and law firms practice multijurisdictionally and
nationally, and about the scope of their national practice.  In particular, 
we do not know how many lawyers are authorized to practice law in 
multiple jurisdictions, let alone how many lawyers are engaged in the 
unauthorized national practice of law.  Disciplinary complaints provide 
only a crude measure of the extent of the unauthorized practice of law, if 
only because discipline is chronically underenforced.39  Nonetheless, it 
seems clear that national, and global, law practice is growing, and is 
only likely to expand even further in the future. 
B.  State-Based Regulatory Approach
Although the practice of law grows national, the regulation of the 
legal profession continues to be state based in four fundamental 
interrelated ways.40  First, admission to the legal profession, including 
administration of the bar exam, is done at the state level.  To be sure, 
some aspects of the admission process are “national,” for example, the
MBE portion of the bar exam, a multiple-choice section testing common
law doctrines in six areas,41 and the MPRE, the legal ethics component
of the bar exam, are used by a vast majority of the states.  Moreover,
some states are exploring the adoption of a nationalized bar exam.42  Yet
empirical evidence about how the elimination of jurisdictional restrictions would affect 
law practice in the United States, and the inability to obtain such evidence without
authorizing national practice.” (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16 (2002))). 
39. Supra note 2.  Moreover, the focus of unauthorized practice of law 
enforcement has traditionally been nonlawyers, not unauthorized lawyers admitted in 
other states.  See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction To Regulate Out-of-
State Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1042 (2002). 
40. It should be noted that in different times different actors within the state 
apparatus assumed primary responsibility for the regulation of the profession.  See
Michael J. Powell, Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer 
Discipline, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 31, 33–35 (examining the processes by which 
state supreme courts assumed responsibility for overseeing disciplinary system in place 
of bar associations).  Moreover, the dominance of state-based regulation has been 
somewhat eroded as of late by the expansion of federal law and with it the federalization 
of law practice.  See Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s 
Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 124–27 
(2011); Bruce A. Green, ABA Ethics Reform from “MDP” to “20/20”: Some Cautionary
Reflections, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 4–7 (arguing that future reform to the regulation of 
lawyers may require abandoning the state-based approach).
41. See The Uniform Bar Examination (UBE), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR 
EXAM’RS, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/ube/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
42. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Several States Move Closer to National Bar Exam, 
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 23, 2009, 1:49 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/several 
_states_move_closer_to_national_bar_exam/; see also Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical 
Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19
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states continue to administer different admission processes and criteria,
including different bar examinations. 
Second, licensing, and hence the ability to practice law, is state based.
Although the language of ABA Model Rule 5.5(a)—the nearly
uniformly adopted rule of professional conduct titled “Unauthorized 
Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law”—is somewhat
unclear on this point, stating that “[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a 
jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction,”43 comment 1 to the rule clarifies that “[a] lawyer may 
practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to
practice.”44  Generally speaking, authorization to practice law in a
jurisdiction is granted via a license, valid only within the issuing state’s
jurisdiction.  Inherently, therefore, the regulatory approach to law 
practice is state based, authorizing lawyers to practice only in a state
where they are licensed and forbidding national law practice.
In 2002, the ABA adopted a Model Rule on Admission by Motion,45 
which permits a lawyer who meets certain conditions to practice law in
host jurisdiction.46  The Admission by Motion Rule has been adopted by
ten jurisdictions, and thirty additional jurisdictions adopted a more 
restrictive version, either requiring reciprocity or imposing additional 
conditions for admission.47  Importantly, while the Admission by Motion 
Rule allows lawyers to practice outside of their home jurisdiction, the 
rule is a classic example of a state-based regulatory approach: it requires
Feb. 2009, at 6–43, available at http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/ 
UBE/780109_be_essays.pdf. 
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2010). 
44. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 1. 
45. See ADMISSION BY MOTION, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
46. Pursuant to the rule, an applicant for admission by motion must be admitted in 
another United States jurisdiction, hold an approved law degree, engage in the continuous
practice of law for a specified period of time, be in good standing in all jurisdictions where 
admitted, have a clean disciplinary record, meet “character and fitness” requirements, and
designate the clerk of the jurisdiction’s highest court for service of process.  Id.
47. Id.  For a comparison chart of states’ admission rules, see AM. BAR ASS’N, 
COMPARISON OF ABA MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION WITH STATE VERSIONS 
(2010) [hereinafter COMPARISON OF MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION], available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/admission_motion_comp.
authcheckdam.pdf. See also AM. BAR ASS’N  JOINT COMM. ON LAWYER REGULATION,
ADMISSION BY MOTION RULES (2010) [hereinafter ADMISSION BY MOTION RULES], http: 
//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/admission_motion_rules.auth













    
 
 




     
 
  
    
   
out-of-state attorneys to apply for admission in each state as a condition 
precedent for practice and grants individual states the power to approve 
or deny applications as they see fit.  In other words, it continues to vest
in states admission, licensing, and enforcement powers. 
Third, rules of professional conduct are adopted by state courts or, less 
commonly, by state legislatures, and apply to lawyers admitted and 
practicing in the state.48  Although the rules of conduct in most states 
follow the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct—with the 
exception of California—they do vary, sometimes in significant ways. 
And while federal statutes increasingly regulate the conduct of lawyers, 
and sometimes attempt to preempt conflicting state rules of ethics,49 such 
federal regulation usually governs only the practice of law before federal 
agencies, that is, federal legal ethics rules apply only in the context of 
practice before federal agencies and do not attempt to replace state legal
ethics rules as the generally applicable body of law regulating lawyers’ 
conduct.50 
Finally, enforcement of the rules takes place at the state level and 
applies within a state.  Specifically, states usually attempt to discipline 
only lawyers admitted in their respective jurisdictions and not out-of-
state lawyers, even if their conduct impacts state interests.51  In  most  
states, state supreme courts are nominally charged with disciplinary
enforcement but delegate investigatory and disciplinary authority to 
regulatory agencies that report to them.52  Increasingly, however, when 
federal statutes regulate the conduct of lawyers, they vest enforcement 
authority in federal agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.53 
48. Id. R. 5.5(a); see also Wolfram, supra note 39, at 1016–21. 
49. See Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 40. 
50. That states play a leading role in promulgating rules of professional conduct
does not suggest, however, clarity in terms of the rules’ content. Indeed, exactly because 
the rules are promulgated on a state basis by multiple state actors, great confusion arises
as to conflicting rules both within states and among states.  See Eli Wald, Should Judges 
Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149 (2010). 
51. Wolfram, supra note 39, at 1017–18, 1050–52 (arguing for increased state
disciplinary enforcement vis-à-vis nonadmitted, out-of-state lawyers). 
52. In Massachusetts, for example, attorney discipline is administered by the Board of 
Bar Overseers, essentially an arm of the Supreme Judicial Court. Board of Bar Overseers,
Office of the Bar Counsel, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/ (last visited Apr. 
24, 2011).  In California, attorney discipline is a function reserved to the California Supreme 
Court and exercised through the California State Bar, a legislatively created public 
corporation that serves as the administrative arm of the supreme court and is answerable
to the court. See In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 55–55, 58–59 (Cal. 1998); 
Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1142–44 (Cal. 1981). 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (“[T]he [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall 
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C.  The Growing Gap Between National Law Practice and a    
State-Based Regulatory Approach 
The growing gap between lawyers’ practice realities that grow 
national in character and the regulatory approach that remains state
based is disconcerting for several reasons.  Fundamentally, the regulatory 
approach appears to have become antiquated and out of touch with
practice realities.  Conceptually, its underlying premise—that most 
lawyers practice locally—no longer accurately reflects many attorneys’
practice realities.  Consequently, the regulatory approach ought to be 
reconsidered and realigned with practice realities or risks becoming of
little relevance to practicing attorneys.  Of course, it is possible that 
compelling arguments exist that might justify adherence to a state-based
regulatory approach and might provide reasons for resisting practice-
based pressures to nationalize law practice.  If so, however, such
arguments must be advanced explicitly by the legal profession because
in the face of the transformation of law practice realities, upholding the 
state-based regulatory approach on the grounds of tradition, historical-
path dependencies, and aversion to change will likely prove insufficient
to stop the rules from becoming obsolete. 
Practically speaking, some might argue that the troubling conceptual
gap between lawyers’ increasingly national practice realities and a state-
based regulatory approach is mitigated by loose and broad interpretation 
of the rules of professional conduct, supported by underenforcement of
the rules.54  That is, although the regulatory approach purports to be state
based, both its construction and lack of enforcement in fact allow
lawyers to practice nationally to some extent, and that therefore
rethinking and reforming the regulatory approach is unnecessary; this
line of thinking may be supported by the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding the extent and scope of national law practice and enforcement
of the state-based approach.  Such “if-it-ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it” 
approach, however, is unpersuasive.  The text of the rules of professional 
conduct does, and should, matter.  The rules provide guidance to 
lawyers, frame and shape enforcement, inform client expectations, and 
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission . . . .”).
54. For an analysis of the extent to which the existing regulatory scheme, although 
formally taking a state-based approach, nonetheless permits, by employing broad and 
loose interpretation, recognizing exceptions and underenforcing, significant national law






















impact attorney-client representations.  A regulatory approach that 
formally purports to adopt a state-based approach but in fact permits 
national law practice is illegitimate, confusing, and unpredictable.  
1. National Law Practice and the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
State-based administration of bar exams and admission procedures
would be of little consequence if a lawyer admitted in any state could 
use the lawyer’s license to practice law nationally.  The state-based
regulatory approach comes into practical life when it generally restricts
the practice of law within state jurisdictional lines and deems practice in
a state without a license the unauthorized practice of law.  Such a 
regulatory constraint on national practice does not meaningfully limit the 
practice of lawyers with local, state practice.  Consider the following 
example: a lawyer licensed, domiciled, and practicing out of a law office
in state A can obviously represent a client domiciled in state A, give 
advice about the laws of state A, and appear in the courts of state A on 
behalf of the client.  Historically, such state-based representation 
constituted the paradigmatic practice of law and was consistent with a 
state-based regulatory approach. 
Consider, however, a basic example of a lawyer engaged in national 
law practice: can a lawyer licensed, domiciled, and practicing out of an
office in state A represent a client domiciled in state A, give advice about
the laws of state B, and appear in the courts of state B on behalf of the
client?  A strict reading of rule 5.5(a) would suggest that a lawyer in 
state A would not be able to give advice about the laws of state B or 
represent clients in the courts of state B, and that doing so would 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.  If this indeed were the case,
then the growing gap between national law practice and a state-based
regulatory approach would have significant and disturbing consequences 
for clients and lawyers.  In this simple scenario, for example, a client
would be forced to retain a lawyer in state B to advise the client on the
laws of state B, and a client with interests triggering questions about the 
laws of multiple states would be forced to retain lawyers in multiple 
jurisdictions, escalating the costs of legal advice and significantly
compromising the ability of clients to do business nationally.
Rule 5.5, however, does not clearly forbid a lawyer in state A from 
giving a client in state A advice about the laws of state B in all
circumstances.  Rather, it answers the question with a case-by-case
“maybe.”  Rule 5.5(c) states that “[a] lawyer admitted in another United
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jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this 
jurisdiction” in four situations delineated in the rule.55  In other words, 
rule 5.5(c) opens the door to national practice and allows a lawyer
admitted in state A to offer advice about the laws of state B and appear in
state B’s courts if the lawyer’s practice in state B is “on a temporary 
basis.”
Comment 6 states,
There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer’s services are provided on
a “temporary basis” in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under
paragraph (c).  Services may be “temporary” even though the lawyer provides
services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of
time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation
or litigation.56 
The constraint on a lawyer’s “temporary basis” services in a jurisdiction 
where the lawyer is not licensed is set in rule 5.5(b), which states in
relevant part: “A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction shall not: (1) except as authorized by these Rules or other 
law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in
this jurisdiction for the practice of law.”57  Comment 4 explains that
“[p]resence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not
physically present here.”58  Read together, pursuant to the rule, a lawyer 
may practice nationally on a temporary basis.  A lawyer in state A cannot 
open an office or establish “systematic and continuous presence” in state 
B, but the lawyer may, per the comment, visit state B on a recurring
basis, or for an extended period of time, if the lawyer is representing a 
client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation. 
The rule and comment shed additional light on the ability to practice 
nationally by specifying four sets of circumstances under which a lawyer 
may practice nationally on a temporary basis, although it should be 
noted that rule 5.5(c) is not meant to be read as a closed list of temporary 
basis circumstances.59 
Subsection 5.5(c)(1) permits a state A lawyer to offer legal services in
state B that are undertaken in association with a state B lawyer “who
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c) (2010). 
56. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 6. 
57. Id. R. 5.5(b). 
58. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 4. 
59. Comment 5 to Model Rule 5.5 clearly states in relevant part: “Paragraph (c) 
identifies four such circumstances.  The fact that conduct is not so identified does not 


























     
    
actively participates in the matter.”60  This authorization of national law 
practice is of little comfort to clients.  To be clear, the provision is 
sensible: a lawyer whose client has material interests in state B would be
prudent to consult with—and in appropriate instances, associate with—a
state B attorney with relevant expertise on the laws of state B.  In this
sense, subsection 5.5(c)(1) is near obvious and would come at clients’ 
expense, as clients would incur the costs and fees of state B lawyer. 
Moreover, comment 8 clarifies that “[f]or this paragraph to apply, 
however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must
actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of 
the client.”61  This means that a state A lawyer would not be able to
essentially practice in state B by nominally associating with a state B
lawyer. For example, a state A lawyer would not be able to research,
prepare, and give advice on the laws of state B and then simply have a 
state B attorney “rubber-stamp” the advice, by printing it, without more,
on its stationary.  Rather, a state B lawyer would have to “actively 
participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the 
client.”62 
Subsection 5.5(c)(2) permits a state A lawyer to offer legal services in
state B that are “reasonably related” to a proceeding before a tribunal in
state B, if the lawyer “is authorized by law or order to appear in such 
proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized.”63  Subsection 
5.5(c)(2) tracks what is commonly known as the pro hac vice provision. 
A pro hac vice is permission granted a lawyer by a court to appear 
before it on a limited basis and would allow, for example, a state A
lawyer to represent a client in proceeding before a state B court. 
Although pro hac vice permissions are generally granted to lawyers in
good standing, it should be noted that many states limit the number of 
pro hac vices an out-of-state attorney may seek in a given year.64 
Nonetheless, subsection 5.5(c)(2) represents a significant move toward 
the nationalization of law practice as it allows a state A lawyer to 
represent a client in state B courts. Comment 11 to rule 5.5 further 
clarifies that when a lawyer is authorized by subsection 5.5(c)(2), 
lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter but who do not
expect to appear before the court or administrative agency are also
60. Id. R. 5.5(c)(1). 
61. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 8 (emphasis added). 
62. Id. R. 5.5(c)(1). 
63. Id. R. 5.5(c)(2). 
64. See generally Clint Eubanks, Can I Conduct This Case in Another State? A 
Survey of State Pro Hac Vice Admission, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 145 (2004); Peter S.
Margulies, Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro 
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authorized.65  Accordingly, a state A lawyer may have a state A associate 
conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses 
in support of the lawyer’s appearance before a state B court.  Similarly,
subsection 5.5(c)(3) permits a state A lawyer to offer legal service in
state B that is reasonably related to arbitration, mediation, or other 
alternative dispute resolution proceeding in state B.66 
Perhaps most importantly, subsection 5.5(c)(4) permits a state A
lawyer to offer legal services in state B that “arise out of or are
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice” in state A.67  Comment 14 to
rule 5.5 explores the variety of factors evidencing such a relationship: 
The lawyer’s client may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or
may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer is admitted.  The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a
significant connection with that jurisdiction.  In other cases, significant aspects
of the lawyer’s work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect
of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction.  The necessary relationship 
might arise when the client’s activities or the legal issues involve multiple
jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey
potential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing the 
relative merits of each.  In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer’s 
recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of
clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally uniform, 
foreign, or international law.68 
As comment 14 makes clear, a state A lawyer may practice nationally 
in state B if a factual or legal nexus exists to the lawyer’s practice in 
State A.  Such nexus may exist if the client has “substantial contacts” to
state A or if the matter has a “significant connection” to state A.69 
Although neither the rule nor comment state so explicitly, it seems clear, 
therefore, that if a state A lawyer represents a client in a complex
transaction and an incidental question regarding state B laws arises, state
A lawyer can research and give the client advice about the laws of state 
B.  The rule’s broad reading of “temporary basis” and “reasonably 
related,” combined with comment 14’s broad construction of the 
circumstances that would constitute a reasonable relationship to a 
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 11. 
66. Id. R. 5.5(c)(3). 
67. Id. R. 5.5(c)(4). 



























lawyer’s home state, practically amounts to a limited license for lawyers
to practice law nationally.70 
Although subsection 5.5(c)(4) does allow limited national law 
practice, it is important, however, not to overstate its scope.  Consider 
the following example.  A client in state B wishes to retain state A
lawyer to represent the client in a transaction that would take place in 
state B, where the counterparty is a state B citizen and the governing 
laws would be state B laws.  Can state A lawyer represent the client?
Subsection 5.5(c)(4) would suggest not because the factors enumerated
in comment 14, requiring a factual or legal nexus to state A to allow the 
lawyer to represent the client, are mostly not present.  The client has not 
been previously represented by state A lawyer, the client is not a state A
resident and has no contacts to state A, and the matter has no significant
connection to state A.  Moreover, no significant aspects of lawyer A’s
work will be conducted in state A, and no aspect of the matter involves 
state A laws.  The only relevant factor referenced in comment 14 is state
A lawyer’s “recognized expertise developed through the regular practice 
of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of . . .
nationally uniform . . . law.”71  Note, however, that even if the transaction 
calls for such “recognized expertise,” the expertise might not suffice to
trigger subsection 5.5(c)(4), and the lawyer risks engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law if the lawyer agrees to represent the client
in this transaction.  Of course, state A lawyer may associate with a state
B lawyer per subsection 5.5(c)(1), but the cost of such affiliation will fall
on the client. 
In sum, rule 5.5 codifies and implements a state-based regulatory 
approach.  As an exception, it allows for only temporary national 
practice, incidental national practice, or limited national practice that has
a strong factual or legal nexus to the state where a lawyer is licensed. 
Although not an insignificant exception, the growing gap between, on
the one hand, clients’ needs and demand for national law practice and
the resulting national law practice, and on the other hand, rule 5.5’s 
state-based regulatory approach, constitutes a significant problem in
need of a solution.  Moreover, to the extent the rule does allow broad 
“temporary” national practice if it is “reasonably related” to the lawyer’s 
70. Id. R. 5.5(c).  Rule 5.5’s approach, requiring a factual or legal nexus to the
state where the lawyer is licensed, is grounded in the old, state-based paradigm of law 
practice.  Consider, for example, a commercial real estate transaction.  The location of 
the property constitutes an important aspect of the transaction and would likely permit a
lawyer licensed in the state where the property is located to represent an out-of-state
buyer or seller, even if the lender was also out-of-state and the transaction governed by
out-of-state law. 
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practice in the lawyer’s home state, it does so in a confusing and 
counterintuitive way, by stating a state-based limitation in subsection
5.5(a) only to permit limited national practice in open-ended and likely 
indeterminate and confusing language in the comment. 
It should be noted that the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
takes a much more relaxed approach to national law practice, stating in 
relevant part: 
[A] lawyer conducting activities in the lawyer’s home state may advise a client 
about the law of another state, a proceeding in another state, or a transaction
there, including conducting research in the law of the other state, advising the 
client about the application of that law, and drafting legal documents intended
to have legal effect there.  There is no per se bar against such a lawyer giving a 
formal opinion based in whole or in part on the law of another jurisdiction, but a 
lawyer should do so only if the lawyer has adequate familiarity with the relevant
law.72 
Practically speaking, however, a lawyer may be reluctant to give a
formal opinion on the law of another jurisdiction: even if a lawyer has 
the relevant expertise to opine on the law of another jurisdiction,73 the
lawyer’s insurer may not cover such an opinion,74 and parties to the 
transaction may demand an opinion from an attorney licensed in the 
state.
In addition, a majority of jurisdictions permit some form of admission 
by motion.75  Although admission by motion certainly opens the door to
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. e (2000). 
73. Model Rule 1.1, which addresses attorney competence, requires that “[a] lawyer 
shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge . . . reasonably necessary for the representation.”  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010). But comment 2 clarifies in relevant part that “[a] lawyer 
need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of
a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. . . .  A lawyer can provide adequate
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.” Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2. By
analogy, it seems clear that a state A lawyer may be competent to give advice about the
laws of state B through the necessary study of state B’s laws. 
74. On the expanding role of insurance companies in regulating lawyer’s conduct, 
see Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers As Regulators of Law Practice, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 210–11 (1996), which argues that insurance is becoming a more 
formal regulatory tool; and Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s 
Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1725–29 (1994), which asserts that
mandatory malpractice requirements allow insurers to determine who practices law.  See 
also John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio’s 
Struggle To Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 101–02 (1999)
(“Professional responsibility experts agree that . . . malpractice liability will play an 
increasing role in regulating attorney conduct.”).



















multijurisdictional practice by allowing out-of-state attorneys to practice 
in host jurisdictions, the measure falls short of nationalizing law 
practice.  First, a majority of the jurisdictions that acknowledge
admission by motion require reciprocity,76 thus the rule may be more 
accurately characterized as taking a bilateral, as opposed to a national, 
approach.  Second, admission by motion is quite expensive, creating a 
practical barrier for such multijurisdictional practice.77  Finally, the
admission-by-motion approach fails to effectively respond to some 
changing practice realities: on the one hand, it requires out-of-state 
attorneys to apply for admission, which their client needs and practice
may not require thus granting more privileges than out-of-state lawyers 
may require, and at the same time, because it is bilateral, state specific,
and costly it does not grant sufficient flexibility for out-of-state 
attorneys.   
Consider the following example.  State A attorney represents a
national client.  In January, the client’s needs require attorney to practice 
law in state B, in April attorney needs to practice for a while in state C, 
in July the client’s interests trigger questions under the laws of state D, 
and in November attorney must address issues in state E.  The client’s
needs do not require permanent admission by motion in states B,  C,  D,
or E, and the cost and delay in seeking admission by motion in any and
all of these states would be significant.78  Rather, such national law
practice requires a more systemic solution, nationalizing the regulatory
approach to the practice of law. 
2. National Law Practice and Splintered Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
Even in circumstances when a lawyer is authorized to practice
multijurisdictionally or even nationally, for example, on a “temporary 
basis” or because a lawyer is licensed in multiple jurisdictions, other 
limiting aspects of the gap between national law practice and a state-
based regulatory approach remain.  Rule promulgation has long been
76. See note 47 and accompanying text. 
77. See ADMISSION BY MOTION RULES, supra note 47 (listing admission by motion 
fees); COMPARISON OF MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION, supra note 47. 
78. The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 questions whether a revised admission 
by motion rule should create a category of admission short of full membership.  See 
ADMISSION BY MOTION, supra note 10, at 5.  Such a new category, however, would be 
unnecessary pursuant to proposed rule 5.5(a), infra Part III.C.3, because out-of-state 
attorneys who meet the proposal’s criteria would be allowed to practice law on a national 
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state based.79  As the practice of law becomes nationalized, however, 
“lawyers have found themselves increasingly subject to the regulation of 
several jurisdictions.  Their ability to find guidance in a single state’s 
code of conduct has virtually disappeared. . . .  [L]awyers are often
subject to multiple sets of professional codes and disciplinary
authorities.”80  The growing gap between lawyers’ national law practice
and a regulatory approach that is state based has dire consequences for
the legal profession: “the splintering of regulation undermines a national 
practitioner’s ability to find guidance.  As a practical matter, the 
splintering creates conflict-of-law issues that lawyers cannot reasonably 
be expected to resolve.”81 
Large law firms with offices in multiple jurisdictions exemplify the 
shortcomings of state-based rules of conduct, as demonstrated by
Zacharias:
[M]embers of the same law firm who belong to different bars or who practice 
through offices in different states are covered by distinct rules.  The ability to
represent a client therefore may vary from lawyer to lawyer in the same firm. 
The liability of firm members for their conduct also may vary, for malpractice 
norms increasingly depend on standards in the applicable professional codes.
These discrepancies create quandaries both for the individual lawyers engaged
in national practice and for the national firms.82 
Moreover, 
[a] firm that has several members representing a corporation may find an issue 
simultaneously governed by the codes in (1) the state in which the firm’s 
lawyers communicate with the corporation (e.g., the firm’s headquarters); (2)
the home states of the lawyers representing the corporation; (3) the home state
of the corporation; and (4) the state in which the legal issue arises.83 
The mismatch between an increasingly common national law practice
and state-based rules, however, is not a problem of large law firms 
alone.  Rather, it applies to and affects all lawyers.  Zacharias explores,
for example, conflicting rules regulating advertisement84 and the ability 
79. Although the dominance of state-based regulation has been somewhat eroded
as of late by the expansion of federal law and with it the federalization of law practice.
See Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 40; Green, supra note 40 (arguing that future 
reform to the regulation of lawyers may require abandoning the state-based approach).
80. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 344–45. 
81. Id. at 352–53. 
82. Id. at 346–47 (footnotes omitted). 
83. Id. at 352. 




















   
 
    
  





of law firms, large and small, to associate themselves with nonlawyers.85 
Additional examples of rule variances that impact all lawyers, working 
in large and small offices alike, include conflict-of-interest rules—in
particular rules pertaining to the representation of coclients86—and 
ethical screens;87 as well as rules regarding fees,88 trust accounts,89 and 
communicating with clients about malpractice liability coverage.90 
Moreover, the splintering of legal ethics rules in the context of a 
national law practice affects core aspects of the practice of law, such as
confidentiality and attorney-client communications.  Consider the 
following example regarding the doctrine of confidentiality.  A criminal
defense attorney represents a client accused of crimes in New York and 
Florida and learns that the client intends to kill witnesses in both 
jurisdictions.  Representing the client in New York, the lawyer will be 
subject to subsection 1.6(b)(1), which gives the lawyer permission to
disclose the information but does not mandate disclosure.91 
Representing the very same client in Florida, however, the lawyer would 
be subject to rule 4-1.6(b)(2), mandating disclosure of the information.92 
If the lawyer decides not to disclose the confidential information
pursuant to New York’s rule 1.6(b)(1), the lawyer will be placed in the
difficult situation of having different and contradictory rules impact a 
core aspect of representing the client. 
Or take, for example, the doctrine of attorney-client
communications—the bedrock of an attorney-client relationship.93 
Consider a California-based law firm with offices in Colorado, the 
District of Columbia, Nevada, and New Mexico.  In California, the 
firm’s lawyers would communicate with clients pursuant to rule 3-500 
about “significant developments relating to the employment or
representation.”94  In Colorado, however, firm lawyers would follow rule
1.4 based on the ABA Model Rules mandating communications designed
to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.”95 
Firm lawyers would have to determine whether California’s rule is 
85. Id. at 350. 
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 29–33 (2010). 
87. See, e.g., COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(e) (2010). 
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010). 
89. Id. R. 1.15. 
90. Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) 
Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 792–97 (2008) (exploring various approaches to
communicating with clients regarding malpractice coverage).
91. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2010). 
92. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (2010). 
93. Wald, supra note 90, at 747–48. 
94. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-500 (2010). 
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broader, calling for communications about both the “employment” and
the “representation,”96 as opposed to Colorado’s rule that only covers the
“status of the matter”;97 or narrower, because California’s rule is limited 
to only “significant developments”98 whereas Colorado’s rule speaks in 
terms of keeping the client “reasonably informed.”99  Lawyers in the
firm’s D.C. office might reasonably wonder too about the scope of their 
obligations because their rule 1.4 follows the old ABA rule that did not 
specify instances mandating communications,100 and attorneys in the
New Mexico office, unlike any of their colleagues, would be subject to
subsection 16-104(C) mandating communications about their malpractice 
liability coverage.101  Finally, although the firm’s Nevada lawyers would
follow the same rule as their Colorado colleagues, they would have to 
maintain a detailed “Lawyer’s Biographical Data Form” pursuant to rule
1.4(c).102  In sum, as Professor Zacharias contends, state-based splintered 
rules of professional conduct seem to ill fit a practice of law that is 
increasingly national in orientation. 
Notably, the splintering of legal ethics rules is not only a problem for 
lawyers.  To the extent that state-based rules inhibit lawyers’ national 
law practice, the limitation imposes costs and delays on clients.  To 
begin, when a client needs to call upon a lawyer to explore aspects of the 
rules of ethics in multiple jurisdictions, not to mention to resolve 
complex questions of choice of law among competing rules of ethics, the 
client will typically incur the costs of the lawyer’s analysis.103  Next,  
when the limitation on national law practice requires the lawyer to 
96. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-500. 
97. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3). 
98. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-500. 
99. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3). 
100. Compare D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2010), with MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2000). 
 101. N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-104(C) (2010). 
 102. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(c) (2010). 
103. In large law firms, for example, prior to the institutionalization and 
professionalization of risk management processes, near-retired or partly retired senior 
partners would often assume the role of “ethics counsel” or informal “ethics guru.”  See
Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 346–47 (2003); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins,
The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance 
Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 563–65, 569–70, 589–91 (2002) 
(describing the emergence of the legal ethics counsel industry); Susan Saab Fortney, Law
Firm General Counsel as Sherpa: Challenges Facing the In-Firm Lawyer’s Lawyer, 53 



















associate with local counsel in a particular jurisdiction,104 the costs of 
representation escalate significantly. 
3. National Law Practice and Rule Enforcement 
The mismatch between state-based rules and a national law practice
impacts not only lawyers, and therefore their clients, but also the
disciplinary authorities charged with enforcing the rules of professional
conduct.  It is important for each jurisdiction to enforce its standards 
because failure to do so breeds distrust of the profession and encourages
poor quality of practice.  Yet enforcement of the rules has long been
plagued by underenforcement.105  Historically, states have appropriated
resources sufficient only for disciplinary action against the most
egregious misconduct and focused their enforcement efforts only on
lawyers admitted in their own states.106 The cost of full enforcement 
appears to be much for the states to bear.  The nationalization of law 
practice further aggravates the problem of underenforcement: at the 
same time, as more lawyers practice multijurisdictionally, it increases 
the number of lawyers practicing in any given state, makes it more 
difficult to discipline them because a growing number of lawyers are 
out-of-state attorneys, and creates possible disputes over authority and 
willingness to discipline. 
4. Does the Growing Gap Between National Law Practice and a 
State-Based Regulatory Approach Constitute a Problem? 
Skeptics might argue that the growing gap between a national law 
practice and a state-based regulatory approach is merely a conceptual 
academic problem that the profession need not worry about.  In 
particular, such critics might point to the fact that there is little empirical 
support to suggest a problem, for example, increased complaints about 
and discipline of unauthorized practice, and no outcry, from lawyers or
clients evidencing a concern. 
The growing gap between practice realities and the regulatory 
approach, however, must be addressed for three interrelated reasons. 
First, even if the growing gap were merely conceptual, it could not be 
left unattended. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are meant to 
guide lawyers’ conduct, provide advice, and inform attorneys’
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2010) (“Competent
representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question.”).
105. See articles cited supra note 2. 
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decisionmaking.  For that reason, they cannot afford to fall behind 
practice realities and cannot offer inconsistent and confusing guidelines. 
In addition, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct symbolically
represent the commitment of the profession to the public to self-regulate 
its own members.  To live up to that promise, the rules must indeed
effectively regulate actual practice realities. 
Second, several factors may explain the lack of empirical evidence 
documenting the gap between practice realities and the regulatory
approach and its consequences.  Because rule 5.5(c)(1) allows out-of-
state lawyers to associate with local lawyers to provide legal services out
of state, client needs for national law advice are not unmet; rather, they
are simply more expansive, and clients shoulder the additional cost. 
Accordingly, out-of-state lawyers do not engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law but instead roll additional costs of providing national law 
advice to their clients.  In addition, some lawyers may engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law by providing legal services out of state and 
go undetected, either because their clients do not know or do not care 
about it.
Third, the current state of affairs serves lawyers’ interests, and the 
profession has little incentive to explore it—let alone address it.  Under
the state-based regulatory approach, clients pay the additional costs of 
their out-of-state lawyers’ consulting with local counsel.  In other words, 
state-based, unauthorized-practice-of-law regulations result in additional 
work for lawyers at clients’ expense.  Moreover, liberalizing the 
regulatory approach and allowing a national law practice might come at 
the expense of local and regional lawyers, who tend to be powerful 
actors in state-level regulation and have ample incentive to oppose 
reform.
In sum, although self-interest, the status quo, and tradition may
explain the bar’s skepticism and reluctance to admit that the growing 
gap between national law practice and a state-based regulatory approach 
constitutes a significant problem in need of addressing, commitment to 
effective client service and to professional values requires, at a
minimum, that the profession engages in a serious examination of the 
problem.  Indeed, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 is examining 
























   
 
contemplating several rule revisions meant to address the growing gap 
between practice realities and the state-based regulatory approach.107  
III. CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL LAW PRACTICE AND 
A STATE-BASED REGULATORY APPROACH 
A.  Nationalizing, by Federalizing, Legal Ethics 
The growing mismatch between an increasingly national law practice
and a state-based regulatory approach to the regulation of law practice
constitutes a problem.  In his influential article, Federalizing Legal 
Ethics, having identified the splintering of legal ethics rules as the 
problem to be addressed, Professor Zacharias focused his attention on 
one solution to it—nationalizing, by federalizing, the rules of legal
ethics.108  In hindsight, however, it has become apparent that the
splintering of legal ethics rules is only part of the problem of the 
growing gap between a national practice and a state-based regulatory 
approach, and focusing on the rules of ethics risks distracting attention 
from other, arguably more significant, challenges of the nationalization
of law practice.  In particular, the legal profession’s experience with
national law practice since 1994 suggests that Federalizing Legal 
Ethics may have simultaneously underexplored and overargued some
aspects of the mismatch problem.
On the one hand, a focus on nationalizing the rules of ethics without
more leaves other threshold problems of a state-based regulatory
approach in a world of a national law practice—the unauthorized
practice of law and splintered enforcement—underexplored.109  The  
fundamental issue plaguing a lawyer with a national law practice is that 
a law license only grants a lawyer the authority to practice law within 
the bounds of the state issuing it.  The representation of clients outside of 
the lawyer’s state of admission is generally prohibited and characterized
as the unauthorized practice of law.  As a result, a lawyer is significantly 
limited in representing clients with national needs and helping them
pursue their interests outside of a lawyer’s state of admission.  Similarly,
a large law firm with multiple offices is limited in representing its 
national clients.  It generally cannot represent clients in jurisdictions in 
which it does not have offices and licensed attorneys, and even where it
does have offices, its representation is limited, for example, the client’s
primary lawyer at the firm may not be able to give it advice or even 
 107. See supra note 10 
108. Professor Zacharias also briefly addresses and dismisses alternative approaches
to nationalizing legal ethics. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 396–402. 
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represent it when the client’s interests fall outside of the primary
lawyer’s state of admission. 
Conceptually, the unauthorized-practice-of-law limitation has nothing 
to do with nationalizing, by federalizing, the rules of professional
conduct because a uniform rule adopted by all states can simply forbid 
multijurisdictional practice.  A recent change to the rules governing the 
unauthorized practice of law illustrates the point.  Following the ABA’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a majority of states have revised
their rules of professional conduct governing multijurisdictional practice.
Although the new rule was meant to achieve greater uniformity, which it 
did,110 it still by and large forbids the regular and continuous
representation of clients on a national basis, outside of a lawyer’s state of
admission. Because most jurisdictions now follow the same legal ethics
rule regarding the unauthorized practice of law, the rules on this issue
are not splintered.  Practically speaking, most states now follow the 
same rule, and the rule regarding the unauthorized practice of law 
approaches a national rule, but this national rule, an example of the very 
solution advocated by Professor Zacharias, does little to address the 
limited ability of lawyers to represent clients nationally because it
continues to forbid multijurisdictional practice.111 
The solution for the fundamental barrier to a national law practice and 
the effective cross-state-borders representation of clients has to do with 
allowing multijurisdictional law practice, and inherently has little to do 
with nationalizing the rules of legal ethics.  Certainly, nationalizing law 
practice may include nationalizing the rules of ethics, but the reverse 
does not follow: nationalizing, by federalizing, or otherwise, the rules of 
ethics does not entail or lead to nationalizing law practice.  In fact, as the 
recently promulgated ABA rule on the unauthorized practice of law
demonstrates, national uniform rules may further inhibit national law 
 110. Greenbaum, supra note 12, at 732–36. 
111. If Congress, in addition to federalizing legal ethics by promulgating a federal
code of conduct, was also to create a federal agency and vest it with disciplinary
enforcement power, such agency might, over time, come to exercise authority over national
admission, collapsing the questions of the unauthorized practice of law and rule
uniformity.  Indeed, a significant body of literature asserts that often disputes about who 
should regulate lawyers are in essence ultimately disputes over the content of the rules. 
See Wald, supra note 50, at 154 (“Notably, the distinction between promulgating and 
enforcing rules, while conceptually clear, is complicated in practice because the two 
forms of regulation intertwine. . . .  This simplifying assumption was heavily challenged
by critics who point out that disputes over rule enforcement are often a cover for 































practice by having most states continue to reject multijurisdictional 
practice.
At the same time as Federalizing Legal Ethics downplays the 
unauthorized practice of law aspect of the problem of a national law 
practice, it also overstates the impact of the mismatch between a national 
law practice and state-based ethics rules and therefore the need to
nationalize legal ethics.  In many of the examples Professor Zacharias
develops, the solution to the tension and inconsistencies between the 
states’ ethics rules does not necessitate nationalizing legal ethics.
Fundamentally, if lawyers could overcome the hurdle of the unauthorized
practice of law, they could fashion solutions to comply with the 
splintered rules of conduct.112  Indeed, Zacharias appears to have
conceded this point, asserting: 
A lawyer can avoid discipline in her home state and a foreign jurisdiction only
if she can identify a course of conduct that neither code forbids.  That may result
either in her pursuing the lowest common denominator among the multiple codes or
violating the spirit of one permissive code provision by blindly following a 
mandatory provision on the same subject in the second state.  Alternatively, the 
lawyer may be driven to ignore the conflict in the rules altogether.113 
Although Zacharias is obviously correct that “[a] lawyer can avoid 
discipline in her home state and a foreign jurisdiction only if she can
identify a course of conduct that neither code forbids,” the rest of the
argument does not follow.  Although some lawyers may pursue “the 
lowest common denominator,” violate the spirit of one permissive code, 
or ignore the conflict in the rules, other lawyers may in good faith 
comply with the rules by employing a choice-of-law analysis and 
proceeding accordingly.114 
More importantly, many of the differences between state rules are
more academic than substantive.  For example, in all of their formulations,
attorney-client communication rules are meant to ensure effective
attorney-client communications.  An attorney attempting to comply with 
the rules in good faith may comply with the rules in all jurisdictions
simply by effectively communicating with the client.  Moreover, in
many instances, the rules provide only the floor for effective
communications.  Competitive market conditions may impose much
more stringent demands, rendering the inconsistencies between state
rules purely academic.
112. By, for example, employing choice of law mechanisms, such as rule 8.5(b). 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (2010). 
 113. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 346 (footnotes omitted). 
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The globalization of law practice may provide an instructive lesson
here regarding rule nationalization: because of the vast differences
between the rules of ethics and regulatory approaches worldwide, a
global code of ethics would likely be based on agreement around core
values, not specific language.115  If a global code of ethics might one day 
soon become a reality, one would think that a national approach to codes 
of ethics should be easier to accomplish based on agreements about core 
values because many of the differences between various states’ rules 
have to do more with language than with substance.  That said, as 
Professor Zacharias convincingly asserts, one should not underestimate 
the problem of lack of uniformity and rule splintering.  For example, 
even if forty-nine jurisdictions adopted a new rule on conflicts of interest 
permitting a law firm to represent a client adverse to another client as 
long as the matters are unrelated and the tainted attorney has been timely
and effectively screened,116 it will take only one state’s refusing to adopt
the rule to render adoption by all other states irrelevant from the 
perspective of a law firm with an office in that one outlier jurisdiction. 
In conclusion, nationalizing, by federalizing, legal ethics solves too 
little and too much of the mismatch problem between a national law 
practice and a state-based regulatory approach.  Because it does not
address the fundamental problem of cross-border national practice—the 
unauthorized practice of law—it solves too little of the mismatch
problem, and in demanding a federalized code of legal ethics it demands
a solution to what may not be, practically speaking, a serious problem, 
splintered state-based rules.
Before exploring other solutions to the challenges of the growing
reality of national law practice, however, one must consider the
additional arguments advanced by Professor Zacharias in favor of 
nationalizing the rules of legal ethics.  To begin with, Professor
115. See H.W. Arthurs, A Global Code of Ethics for the Transnational Legal Field, 
2 LEGAL ETHICS 59, 64–65 (1999) (discussing the difficulties of creating a universal or 
global code of ethics and criticizing such codes as ineffective); Andrew Boon & John
Flood, Globalization of Professional Ethics? The Significance of Lawyers’ International 
Codes of Conduct, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 29, 50–51 (1999) (arguing that the absence of
discourse about the international codes is a barrier to the globalization of professional 
ethics); Laurence Etherington & Robert Lee, Ethical Codes and Cultural Context: 
Ensuring Legal Ethics in the Global Law Firm, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 95, 106– 
07, 108 & n.54 (2007). 
116. Compare COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(e) (2010), with MODEL 























      
 
Zacharias explored in great length another justification for nationalizing 
legal ethics—client perception regarding splintered rules.  He argued 
that “splintered rules negatively affect the image of lawyers and clients’
ability to trust lawyers, because the splintered rules skew client
perceptions of lawyer obligations.”117 
Client perception of the legal profession is indeed an important
consideration.  Respect for law and lawyers is fundamental for the 
effective operation of our legal system and the rule of law, and the legal
profession is particularly sensitive for claims regarding its status and 
perception in part out of concern for the rule of law, in part out of self-
interest.  Yet it is doubtful whether the growing mismatch between a 
national law practice and state-based rules plays a meaningful role in
sustaining or eroding public trust in the profession.  The public
perception of the rule of law is more likely influenced by considerations 
such as access to justice, especially by those unable to afford private 
legal services and the fairness of the criminal justice system.118  Even 
when it comes to lawyers, it seems that clients and the public are 
concerned with lawyers’ ineffective communication skills and harsh 
zeal, and not with the rules of professional conduct or their enforcement.119 
Indeed, Zacharias himself recognizes the relative weakness of the 
argument stating, “I do not mean to overstate the case.  I have already
noted that client perceptions often stem from factors other than
professional regulation and media accounts of lawyer conduct.”120 
Even so, it is just unclear how nationalization of the rules of legal
ethics would impact public perception of the profession.  Clients likely 
do not know and do not care what the rules of professional conduct say
in a particular jurisdiction and whether they are uniform across
jurisdictions.  Clients may care indirectly about nationalizing legal ethics 
to the extent that the current splintered rules inhibit effective client
service, and a national approach to regulation would result in more 
effective legal services, and to the extent that nationalizing legal ethics
may result in a more effective disciplinary system to address attorney
misconduct.  Yet because nationalizing the rules does little to address the 
fundamental problem of national law practice—multijurisdictional 
practice—nationalizing legal ethics is not likely to impact client service
 117. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 345. 
118. See, e.g., Robert A. Stein, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 505–06 
(2007); see also Richard J. Cebula, Does Lawyer Advertising Adversely Influence the 
Image of Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative Perspective and New Empirical 
Evidence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 508–10 (1998). 
 119. Wald, supra note 90, at 747–48. 
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significantly and therefore will have little impact on client perception, 
even if most clients generally wish to conduct themselves in accordance 
with the law and wish to have their lawyers represent them accordingly.
Similarly, as Professor Zacharias noted, nationalizing legal ethics may
result in more effective enforcement only if a new, federal agency will 
assume responsibility for enforcement,121 an unlikely proposition.
Therefore, the argument that nationalizing legal ethics will improve the 
perception of the legal profession appears somewhat doubtful.
Next, Zacharias argues that “[t]he existing models of regulation tend 
to focus only on litigation and to minimize the importance of
transactional and advice-based practice.”122  Zacharias is correct that the
rules of professional conduct have long been justly criticized for
assuming litigators as the paradigmatic lawyers and regulating 
accordingly.123  Of course, in historical hindsight, until the late nineteenth
century, most lawyers were generalists and many, at least on occasion, 
appeared in court.  The emphasis of early codes, for example, the
Alabama code124 and even the ABA Canons,125 on litigators was thus
understandable.  Since then, as corporate lawyers have come to have 
equal claim to represent mainstream practice and so many lawyers 
practice outside of the courtroom, the ABA has been struggling to
amend its rules to reflect the diversity of practice settings and realities.126 
The rules’ emphasis on litigators and relative neglect of so many other
practice areas indeed constitutes a disturbing problem.127 
As is the case with the public perception of lawyers, however, it is
unclear that nationalizing the rules of legal ethics and promulgating a 
121. Id. at 384–85, 404. 
122. Id. at 370.
123. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty
to Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909, 934–35 (2009). 
124. Id. at 928. 
125. See L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 
EMORY L.J. 909, 935 (1980). 
126. Indeed, this was part of the mandate of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission and 
is once again a mandate for the newly established ABA 20/20 Commission.  See Ethics
2000 Commission, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011); 
ABA Commission on Ethics, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/ (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
127. On the need for contextual regulation, see generally David B. Wilkins, Who 
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).  Four years later, an entire 
symposium issue revisited Wilkins’s analysis.  See Symposium, Institutional Choices in 


























    
 
national code of ethics will resolve this problem.  At best, promulgating 
a new code of conduct constitutes an opportunity to draft rules that will 
be more sensitive to other types of practice.  At the same time,
promulgating a “one-size-fits-all” national code of conduct applicable to
all lawyers may further aggravate the problem of abstract regulation, 
detached from the actual practices of lawyers.  For example, the solution 
for the increased specialization of lawyers and expansion of practice
areas may be regulating these specialties in context via multiple codes of 
ethics.  And even if the most effective way to regulate an increasingly
diverse legal profession is to insist on a “one-size-fits-all” approach, it 
may very well be that in the short run a state-based approach allowing 
for experimentation with contextual regulation may be superior to a 
national code approach.
Finally, Professor Zacharias asserts that:  
federal decisions and administrative regulation already undermine the force of
state rules, thereby distorting lawyers’ views of how they must approach advocacy. 
Without uniform guidance, lawyers and clients may soon become unable to rely
on a single vision of the attorney-client relationship and accordingly may be
unable to order their conduct.128 
Once again Professor Zacharias astutely identifies an important
development with far-reaching consequences but does not explain fully
how it might be addressed by nationalizing legal ethics.  It is true that 
the ongoing federalization of legal ethics undermines the force of state 
rules.129  And Professor Zacharias may even be right that the “ever-
increasing impact of federal professional regulation on the conduct of 
lawyers” might mean that “federal law now provides the ‘dominant
vision’ of lawyers’ proper role.”130  It is certainly also the case that some
commentators have suggested that federal law attempts to promote a
vision of lawyers as gatekeepers, who owe duties to nonclients, the legal 
system, and the public, and as public citizens.131 
Yet it is an overstatement to suggest that these developments distort
“lawyers’ views of how they must approach advocacy,” and that 
“lawyers and clients may soon become unable to rely on a single vision
of the attorney-client relationship.”132  The issues are much more
complex than that.  First, the most significant attacks on the traditional 
conception of lawyers’ role as client advocates, or the “standard 
 128. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 345. 
129. Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 40. 
 130. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 368. 
131. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 231–32, 348–51 (2006). 
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conception,”133 have come from leading legal ethicists, not federal 
regulation.134  Second, the standard conception has proven to be
extremely robust and resistant to change.  If at all, client-centered 
ideology to the exclusion of lawyers as officers of the court and as
public citizens is more dominant today than it has ever been.135 
Ironically then, to the extent that splintered federal regulation has 
undermined the dominant view of the lawyer’s role, which is doubtful,
that would arguably be a desirable outcome, and any kind of
nationalization agenda would have to be mindful of not bolstering the 
standard conception even further. 
In sum, the nationalization, even globalization, of law practice is 
without a doubt a significant development.  Client needs increasingly 
require cross-border and multijurisdictional representation.  A regulatory 
approach that limits lawyers to law practice within state borders is
growing increasingly anachronistic.  In particular, one consequence of
the mismatch between a national law practice and a state-based
regulatory approach is that the state-based rules of ethics create a
splintered and challenging reality for lawyers and their clients.  Yet such
mismatch is not sufficiently addressed by nationalizing legal ethics
because nationalizing the rules does little to address issues such as 
nationalizing admissions, ability to practice, and enforcement.  In fact, 
nationalizing legal ethics may further hinder a national law practice with
a national rule adopted by most states forbidding multijurisdictional 
practice.
Fred Zacharias’s Federalizing Legal Ethics is an excellent, even 
prophetic, article correctly anticipating practice developments and
133. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 63, 73 (1980); see also William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ideology of 
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 37. 
 134. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 148–49, 160–74 
(1988) (arguing for a system of “‘moral activism’: a vision of law practice in which the 
lawyer who disagrees with the morality or justice of a client’s ends does not simply
terminate the relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better”); DAVID LUBAN, 
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19–64 (2007) (criticizing the principle of
nonaccountability for protecting lawyers from moral culpability for a client’s conduct); 
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 22–30 (1988) 
(developing the concept of purposive lawyering); David Luban, The Lysistratian 
Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 645; 
Simon, supra note 133, at 113–19. 
135. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Law Practice as a Morally Responsible Business: 
Reintegrating Values into Economics and Law (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript)




















      
     
 
    
compellingly identifying a serious flaw in the state-based regulatory 
approach to law practice.  And although Zacharias’s overall argument in
favor of nationalizing legal ethics ultimately does not succeed, the case 
remains that as the practice of law becomes increasingly national, a
state-based approach to regulating lawyers makes less and less sense.  At
the end of the day, Federalizing Legal Ethics may have lost the battle for 
nationalizing legal ethics but won the war over the future of the 
regulatory approach to law practice by demonstrating that it must 
abandon a state-based approach in favor of a multijurisdictional 
approach. 
B.  Nationalizing Law Practice 
The regulatory response to a practice of law that is becoming 
increasingly national seems straightforward—it too needs to become
national in orientation.  The case for nationalizing law practice is equally 
straightforward: the legal profession is a service vocation, and if clients’
needs are increasingly national and require lawyers who can serve them
on a national basis then the legal profession ought to transform itself into 
a national-based profession.  In other words, if client needs cannot be
met because state-based rules restrict the ability of lawyers to provide 
national service, then the solution seems obviously clear—relax the 
restrictive state-based rules unless there are compelling reasons to keep
them in place. 
The case for nationalizing law practice is bolstered by the sense that 
the legal profession’s traditional stance against nationalizing law 
practice smacks of self-interest and protectionism.136  A state-based 
regulatory approach, instituted by unauthorized practice of law rules, 
greatly benefits lawyers at the expense of clients.  It creates a cottage
industry of “local counsel” and inflated legal fees forcing clients to pay 
for both their regular lawyers and a host of local counsel.  The ABA 
Model Rules’ approach to unauthorized practice illustrates the point: the 
old version of rule 5.5 demanded that lawyers affiliate with local
counsel,137 and the new so-called liberal approach goes even further. 
Although it allows residual temporary practice for out-of-state lawyers, 
it demands that local counsel participate meaningfully in the 
representation,138 ensuring local counsel greater fees.
136. See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional 
Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 998 (2003). 
137. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(1) (2010), with MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2002).
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Furthermore, the state-based approach appears to impose higher costs
on national clients and lawyers with a national practice as a result of 
deference to local professional interests.  The spectacular rise and
expansion of large law firms with multijurisdictional presence lends 
support to this hypothesis:139 the state-based approach appears to 
unabashedly protect local professional interests at clients’ and national 
lawyers’ expense.  First, it encourages large law firms to open offices in 
local jurisdictions and hire local attorneys.  Large law firms may very
well be able to offer more efficient legal services without opening
regional offices directly from their out-of-state home office.  Yet state-
based rules and unauthorized practice of law rules discourage such an
approach.  For example, a state-based approach arguably protected the 
California bar from the East Coast invasion in the 1970s and 1980s,140 
and it continues to protect smaller jurisdictions from invasions by large 
law firms and relatively insulates large jurisdiction lawyers from each
other.  Second, the need to have local counsel transfers legal fees from 
large national law firms to such local counsel. 
Nationalizing law practice returns us to Zacharias’s article because the
only practical way to accomplish the task appears to be to federalize the 
practice of law.  Federalizing law practice, however, is much broader
than federalizing legal ethics.  It would involve, at least, uniform 
national admission standards, national licenses to practice throughout the 
United States, uniform national rules of ethics, and a uniform national 
enforcement agency.141 
History, tradition, anxiety about the unknown, and resistance from 
both local bar interests and the organized bar fearing that nationalization
by federalization will be the end of self-regulation all stand in the way of
nationalizing law practice.  History and tradition are always forces 
delaying progress, and this is especially the case for a profession that 
builds on respect for authority, established rules, hierarchal systems, and 
history, as well as on precedent.  Fear of the unknown, a universal hurdle
to change, is similarly applicable to the legal profession that has for long 
139. See supra note 25. 
140. See, e.g., TONY MASSARO, F. DANIEL FROST: WESTERN LAWYER, LEADER, 
ENTREPRENEUR, PHILANTHROPIST (forthcoming 2011) (studying the transformation of 
California-based law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher into a global law firm including
its response to East Coast invasion of California by large Wall Street law firms). 
141. Zacharias did endorse, but did not elaborate on, a federal enforcement agency. 



























benefited from elevated social and cultural—not to mention financial— 
standing.  Local lawyers, often a powerful constituency with regard to
rule promulgation and enforcement, have reasons to oppose nationalizing
law practice, and the organized bar has an interest in preserving self-
regulation.  All of these powerful, practical considerations notwithstanding,
are there compelling justifications against nationalizing law practice in
the interest of clients? 
Four types of arguments come to mind.  First, states have long argued
that they have a legitimate interest in regulating lawyers practicing in 
their jurisdiction in order to protect their citizens and exercise control 
over state power within their respective jurisdictions.142  In Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, the Court recognized that states regulate lawyers to
protect the public’s health and safety,143 explaining that “[t]he interest of
the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice,
and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’”144  A couple years
later in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona the Court reiterated that “the
regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State’s power to 
protect the public.”145  In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,146 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, explained that often state lawmakers are 
also lawyers147 and stated: 
Put simply, the State has a substantial interest in creating its own set of laws 
responsive to its own local interests, and it is reasonable for a State to decide
that those people who have been trained to analyze the law and policy are better
equipped to write those state laws and adjudicate cases arising under them.148 
Justice Rehnquist explained that a “State’s interest [does not] end with
enlarging the pool of qualified lawmakers.  A State similarly might 
determine that because lawyers play an important role in the formulation 
of state policy through their adversary representation, they should be 
intimately conversant with the local concerns that should inform such
policies.”149 
142. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990) (describing state 
interests to include “improving the quality of legal services”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 
421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially 
great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering 
justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’”). 
143. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). 
144. Id. 
145. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 361–62 (1977). 
146. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). 
147. See id. at 292 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
148. Id.
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History and tradition further support states’ claim to regulate lawyers 
as an expression of their exercise of state power.  Jose Arambulo gives a
brief summary of the constitutional basis for state regulation of lawyers: 
“Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers
has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their
respective jurisdictions.”  With this regulatory power, “[t]he States prescribe the
qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of professional 
conduct” and “are responsible for the discipline of lawyers.”  This state power
to oversee the practice of law within their jurisdiction is exercised through the 
respective state supreme courts which have “the authority to discipline and
ultimately to disbar lawyers whose conduct departed from prescribed standards.” 
These state courts in turn entrust the authority to prescribe the qualifications for 
admission to practice law and the standards of professional conduct for lawyers
within their states to their respective state bars.
Deference to states’ authority to regulate the practice of law has been
recognized by the highest court in the land pursuant to the states’ police powers, 
and the states’ regulatory authority over the legal profession is only limited by
certain circumstances.”150 
In more recent decisions, however, courts have refined the analysis, 
framing the justification for state regulation of lawyers less in terms of 
abstract protection of state citizens and the exercise of state power, and 
more in terms of protecting clients from attorney abuse and offering
quality control measures with regard to legal services.  For example, in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Court held that the “protection of
potential clients’ privacy is a substantial state interest,”151 and in Mason 
v. Florida Bar, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the 
Supreme Court confirmed long ago that the state has both a general 
interest in protecting consumers, as well as a special responsibility to 
regulate lawyers”152 
The modern justification for state-based regulation of lawyers is 
therefore consumer based.  Based on the assumptions that many clients 
seek legal advice when they are vulnerable, and that often clients are not 
in a position to evaluate the quality of legal services they receive, state-
150. Jose A. Arambulo, O Where, O Where Has My Legal Job Gone?: Examining
the Realities of “Offshoring” Legal Work and Why States Can Regulate the Practice
Despite Congress’ Broad Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, 38 SW. L. REV., 
195, 211–12 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
151. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
152. Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 956 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  See 
also Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990) (describing state interests to include 
























   
    
  
     
     
      
  
   
based regulation is meant to protect clients from predatory conduct such
as in-person solicitation, unreasonable fees, and betrayal of client 
trust.153 
Although consumer protection is an important goal, it is unclear that 
state-based regulation of lawyers best achieves it, or even reasonably
achieves it.  States have traditionally delegated the regulation of the legal 
profession to the organized bar,154 and the self-regulation apparatus
implemented by state bars has been consistently criticized for being 
inefficient, underenforced, and generally too favorable to lawyers at the 
expense of clients.155  Moreover, even if state-based regulation does
accomplish its job, there is little reason to believe that a federal
apparatus would be less effective.  To be sure, states have a legitimate
interest in protecting their citizens from wrongdoing, in particular from 
abuse by lawyers, and nationalizing law practice would entail ceding 
enforcement power to a federal enforcement agency thus compromising 
state power and opportunity to offer protection to its citizens.  Yet states’
relative poor record of disciplinary enforcement undermines the strength 
of this argument.  Moreover, restricting national law practice in the 
name of protecting clients is ironic given that national law practice is a 
client-driven development serving client interests.  
A second argument in favor of state-based regulation has to do with
ensuring access to legal services.156  States have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that their citizens have access to legal services, and state-based
regulation, at least in theory, allows them to pursue this goal.  Once
again, although access to legal services is a fundamental aspect of a 
legitimate legal system, state-based regulation has a poor record in 
promoting it.  To begin with, states have essentially abandoned attempts
to erect barriers to entry and foregone any serious attempts to restrict the 
number of lawyers licensed in their jurisdictions.157  In other words, they
have allowed the market to control the number of lawyers practicing law
and, with the exception of some aspects of criminal law where access to 
lawyers and representation is mandated by the Constitution, leave to
153. See  TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in  ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (rev. ed. 1954); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: 
Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 16–17 (1975). 
 154. Wald, supra note 50, at 9–12. 
155. See sources cited supra notes 1–3. 
156. See, e.g., Mason, 208 F.3d at 956 (“The Bar also asserts an interest in ensuring
that the public has access to relevant information to assist in the comparison and selection of
attorneys.  Again, there is little question that the state, as part of its duty to regulate attorneys,
has an interest in ensuring and encouraging the flow of helpful, relevant information about 
attorneys” (citing Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 
110 (1990)). 
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market forces of supply and demand the issue of access to lawyers.
More importantly, states have done little to increase access to legal 
services.  They have traditionally not sponsored legal clinics, legal aid
societies, or mandatory pro bono initiatives.  If at all, the federal
government has as good, yet still a relatively poor, track record in terms 
of enhancing access to legal services.158 
It is true that nationalizing law practice could very well have 
significant impact on access to legal services.  Franchise law firms may
displace solo and small firm lawyers as the primary providers of legal 
services, akin to Walmart’s displacing local grocers and Barnes & 
Noble’s crowding out of neighborhood bookshops,159 and large law 
firms may attract the most profitable and lucrative clients and business
away from local lawyers, essentially shifting power and money away 
from local bars and regional lawyers to national law firms.  Yet it is
unclear that any of these changes would harm local client consumers.160 
Third, Professor Stephen Gillers develops a thought-provoking 
argument in favor of protecting local bars: 
[T]here is reason to accept the proposition that the legal profession is a different
kind of business because its members have historically played a role in the
governance of their communities.  Sometimes this role is formalized, as when
state law compels membership in the state’s bar association and assigns it
governmental duties. Sometimes the role is informal, as when lawyers work pro
bono or volunteer to work on court committees or as members of government
commissions.
The question must be asked—Will easy cross-border practice result in the
exodus of desirable work as clients, perhaps solicited, gravitate toward lawyers 
in adjacent states or even more distant places, thereby weakening the economic
base of the local bar and depleting the time and personnel available to do pro
bono and volunteer work for individuals, government, non-profit groups, and
the justice system?161 
158. See, e.g., Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social Contract:
When Will the United States Finally Guarantee Its People the Equality Before the Law 
the Social Contract Demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 189 (2010). 
 159. VAN HOY, supra note 27, at 137; Lance J. Rogers, Speakers Review, Seek
Reform of Rules that Inhibit Multijurisdictional Law Practice, 17 LAW. MANUAL ON 
PROF. CONDUCT 351 (2001). 
 160. Silver, supra note 38. 
 161. Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission:
























Professor Gillers is quick to disavow promoting the profession’s self-
interest.162  And although cynics might be quick to dismiss his defense of
local bars, his argument is certainly supported by history and traditional 
cultural understanding of lawyers as public citizens and leaders in their 
communities.  To be clear, to the extent that lawyers serve the public
interest solely by serving the private interests of their clients, it is indeed 
hard to see how protecting local bars would benefit clients and the
communities in which they practice.  To the extent, however, that
lawyers serve the public good in ways other than and in addition to 
serving clients, destabilizing and weakening local bars might very well
diminish lawyers’ contributions to the public good.  For example, to the 
extent that local lawyers serve as local leaders, community organizers,
and benefactors of the community, crowding them out may harm the 
communities in significant ways. 
Finally, one cannot dismiss a significant practical impediment to 
nationalizing law practice: the opposition of the legal profession and the 
reluctance of the federal government.  Zacharias assumed that the legal 
profession would generally endorse nationalizing legal ethics because 
practicing nationally in a state-based regulatory environment was costly 
for lawyers.163  The reality, however, is more complex, and the legal 
profession has turned out to be an opponent of nationalizing legal ethics 
for four interrelated reasons.  The legal profession consists of different
constituencies with different interests and does not speak in one voice.
Although large law firms with significant national practice and other
lawyers with a growing national constituencies would likely benefit 
from a more liberal approach to multijurisdictional practice, other 
segments of the profession might suffer from such a transformation. 
Local bars, for example, would likely lose significant clients, business,
and prestige, and local lawyers tend to be influential in local bars that
would have to give up state-based regulation. 
Next, the organized bar is likely to oppose nationalization of legal 
ethics because it would constitute a significant step toward giving up on 
self-regulation.  Because nationalizing law practice could practically
only be accomplished by federalizing law practice, the shift would entail 
not only shifting power from state and local lawyers to a centralized 
system, but also shifting power from state courts and local lawyers164 to 
the federal branch.  And although lawyers would no doubt be involved 
in the federal branch, promulgation of a federal code of ethics will likely
162. “Nor do I mean to embrace that part of the ‘professionalism’ campaign that is 
little more than institutional self-promotion.” Id. at 702–03. 
 163. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 345–54. 
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yield power to Congress, and enforcement of such a code would fall to a 
federal agency.  The organized bar has consistently and systematically 
fought off attempts—real and perceived—to diminish the profession’s
self-regulation.  And although the federalization of legal ethics has been
an ongoing phenomenon,165 the organized bar is likely to oppose and
resist the nationalization of law practice to the extent that it involves 
yielding power to self-regulate. 
In addition, and perhaps counterintuitively, large law firms with a
growing national practice—arguably the one constituent within the legal
profession with the most incentive to push for nationalizing law
practice—actually have an incentive to oppose such a change as well.
State-based enforcement of legal ethics rules has long been lacking, 
suffering from being understaffed, underbudgeted, bogged down by
ineffective bureaucracies, and a poor reputation for enforcement.166 
Many state regulatory agencies already find that they cannot enforce the 
existing rules.  Instead, they focus their enforcement efforts against 
egregious offenders in the most severe cases.
In particular, state enforcement agencies have mostly shied away from 
regulating the conduct of large law firms and focused their attention on 
solo practitioners and small law firms.167  The reasons for this priority
are complex: large law firms’ clients tend to be sophisticated powerful
actors vis-à-vis their lawyers, and they tend to “discipline” their lawyers
privately rather than resort to filing a disciplinary complaint.  In other 
words, protecting clients of large law firms tends to be a low priority for
disciplinary agencies.  Next, enforcing against large law firms is likely 
to consume significant resources that disciplinary agencies do not have.
Large law firms are likely to fight discipline because of their concern for
reputational implications and protecting their elevated status within the 
profession, and can both outspend and outnumber the disciplinary 
offices.  Consequently, large law firms are hardly the target of significant 
disciplinary efforts. 
This means that under the current regulatory regime large law firms 
relatively get away with violations of the ethics rules, including rules
regarding the unauthorized practice of law.  A shift to a national system 
with a more effective federal enforcement agency might make large law
165. Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 40, at 124–25. 
166. Id. at 147–48. 



























firms more of a target of regulation.  Put differently, although in theory
large law firms and their clients should benefit from nationalizing law 
practice, in practice, given the underenforcement of rules vis-à-vis large 
firms, they may have little to gain and quite a bit to lose from a shift to a
nationalized system.  Indeed, instead of pushing for an overhaul of the
regulatory system, large law firms have focused their attention—and 
successfully so—on piecemeal revisions to the rules that best suit their 
interests, such as relaxing confidentiality demands to allow for conflict
checks,168 and relaxing imputation of conflicts of interests with “ethical 
screens” to avoid disqualification.169 
Lastly, the federal branch has shown little interest in stepping in to 
federalize law practice, and its reluctance is quite understandable.  The 
cost of promulgating a federal code of ethics is likely to be high, the cost 
of enforcing it very high, the legal profession could be counted on to 
resist such efforts, and the benefit might flow initially to large entity
clients and their lawyers, not a particularly attractive constituency in 
terms of public relations.  Of course, if large entities and their lawyers 
lobbied for such a reform, Congress might get more motivated to act, but
as we have seen because state-based enforcement is ineffective when it
comes to large law firms, these firms and their clients have little 
incentive to lobby Congress for a change. 
In conclusion, nationalizing law practice seems premature conceptually 
and infeasible practically.  In theory, nationalizing law practice would 
allow lawyers to serve clients more effectively and would therefore
likely reduce the costs of legal services and enhance access to legal
services.  In reality, however, some serious concerns about the
consequences of nationalizing law practice would have to be addressed 
before abandoning the state-based regulatory approach.  States may have 
a legitimate interest in, and may do a better job of, regulating lawyers 
than a national entity could.  Nationalizing the regulatory approach to
law practice may compromise access to legal services and may impact
the quality of legal services, and nationalizing law practice may
undermine local bars and may diminish the ability of lawyers to act as 
public citizens.  For example, to the extent that local lawyers are
invested in their communities, contribute to them, and help address local
legal needs, weakening them would be undesirable.  The point, to be
clear, is not to support localism, protectionism, and state-based
regulation at the expense of enhanced competition in the market for legal
services; rather, it is to acknowledge that given the role of law and 
lawyers in the United States, the market for legal services may have
 168. Wald, supra note 1, at 204. 
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some unique features that would require consideration before allowing
national competition with the possible weakening of local lawyers. 
At the end of the day, nationalization of law practice may be
inevitable.  Client needs increasingly demand it, and arguments against 
it, both conceptual and practical, are not compelling.  Certainly, there is
little reason to resist nationalization of law practice on the ground that it 
would harm the financial interests of local lawyers.  Yet until further 
analysis and empirical evidence regarding the consequences of 
nationalizing law practice becomes available,170 an interim solution may 
be appropriate. 
C.  An Intermediary Approach to Addressing the Mismatch         
Between a National Law Practice and a State-Based    
Regulatory Approach: An Open-Border         
Multidisciplinary Practice 
Client needs demand a national law practice.  Although nationalization of
law practice could include the adoption of national admission standards, 
including a national bar exam, national licensing scheme, national rules 
of ethics, and national enforcement of discipline, effectively addressing
client needs does not require such a comprehensive transformation.  At 
least in the short run, a significant aspect of the mismatch problem could 
be effectively addressed by allowing multijurisdictional and national 
practice.  An intermediary approach, not going quite as far as nationalizing 
law practice, would simply relax the general prohibition against
multijurisdictional practice, codified in ABA Model Rule 5.5, allowing 
lawyers to practice nationally while retaining state control over 
admission, licensing, and discipline. 
1. Open-Border Multijurisdictional Approach: 
The Colorado Experience 
Rule 5.5’s general prohibition of multijurisdictional practice and its 
narrow exceptions make it clear that out-of-state lawyers cannot offer 
legal services in a host jurisdiction on a regular, systematic, and
continuous basis.  Given its relatively strict prohibition of multijurisdictional
practice, it is somewhat surprising that the rule, the result of the ABA’s 




















    
   
 
 
multidisciplinary committee’s reform, is considered a step on the road to
nationalizing law practice.171 
The rule, however, could be easily amended to allow multijurisdictional 
and national practices, following the Colorado example.  Colorado’s 
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, as implemented by its rules of civil 
procedure, has essentially adopted an intermediary “open border”
approach pursuant to which any out-of-state attorney may offer
transactional counseling or any other out-of-court legal services in 
Colorado without fear of violating the proscription on unauthorized 
practice of law.172  The relevant rules define an “out-of-state” attorney as
one who (1) is licensed to practice law and is on active status in another 
jurisdiction in the United States; (2) is a member in good standing of the 
bar of all courts and jurisdictions in which the attorney is admitted to
practice; (3) has not established domicile in Colorado; and (4) has not 
established a place for the regular practice of law in Colorado from 
which the attorney holds out to the public as practicing Colorado law or
solicits or accepts Colorado clients.173  Colorado’s rules generally still
require an out-of-state attorney wishing to appear before a Colorado
tribunal to seek a pro hac vice, and notably its rules do not apply to any
foreign attorney.174 
The first out-of-state Colorado requirement is arguably a quality 
control measure.  An attorney without a Colorado law license could still 
practice law in Colorado if the attorney obtains a law license in another 
United States jurisdiction, presumably implying pursuing a legal 
education at an American accredited law school, passing a bar exam, and
completing a bar application.  All of these measures in turn are meant to 
establish a basis of competence, and therefore if these standards have
been satisfied in another United States jurisdiction, they address
Colorado’s interest in ensuring quality and competence.175  Similarly, the 
second out-of-state standard, requiring an active status in good standing, 
reflects a commitment to ensuring a basic measure of quality.  The 
objective underlying Colorado’s third and fourth requirements is not as 
straightforward.  Perhaps the issue of establishing a domicile and a
permanent office reflects an assumption that these correlate with having 
 171. Greenbaum, supra note 12. 
 172. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2010); see also Robert R. Keatinge et 
al., Colorado Adopts Rules Governing Out-of-State Attorneys, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 
27. 
 173. COLO. R. CIV. P. 220. 
174. Id.
175. States, of course, may differ in their preference for quality controls.  Colorado, 
for example, may deem that another state’s admission standards are too low to guarantee 
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a majority of Colorado clients, in which case Colorado wants to have a
more direct regulatory nexus and would require such attorneys to get 
admitted in Colorado. 
Importantly, Colorado’s rules require an out-of-state attorney 
practicing in Colorado to comply with the Colorado Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the rules applicable to attorney regulation in Colorado,
including attorney discipline.176  This provision protects the Colorado
public from misconduct by out-of-state lawyers because it grants
Colorado’s disciplinary agency, the Office of Regulation Counsel, 
authority to prosecute ethical violations committed by out-of-state
attorneys in Colorado, rather than referring them to the disciplinary
agency in the out-of-state lawyer’s home jurisdiction. 
The arguments against nationalization have failed to materialize in
Colorado.  Having subjected out-of-state lawyers to its disciplinary 
jurisdiction, Colorado has retained the ability to protect its citizens from
abuse, consistent with the rationale of offering citizens consumer 
protection.  And out-of-state lawyers and law firms have not compromised 
access to legal services in the state, nor have they significantly 
destabilized the leadership of the local bar.177  It should be conceded,
however, that Colorado’s experience may be limited to its circumstances: 
although the actual number of out-of-state lawyers practicing Colorado
law is unknown, there is little reason to believe it is a significant
number.  Moreover, unlike, for example, Delaware’s corporate law,
Colorado’s laws are not commonly known to be in use outside of 
Colorado,178 and unlike New York and California, Colorado’s law is not
commonly chosen by choice-of-law provisions to govern contracts 
outside of Colorado.  Similarly, Colorado has not seen an influx of large
law firms moving into the state, crowding out its local law firms and 
legal elite.179  In other words, some of the risks inherent in the
nationalization of law practice were unlikely, and did not affect 
 176. COLO. R. CIV. P. 220. 
 177. Eli Wald, The Other Legal Profession and the Orthodox View of the Bar: The
Rise of Colorado’s Elite Law Firms, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 605, 678–79 (2009) (noting the 
stability of Colorado’s elite law firms and the relative inability and disinterest of large 
national law firms to establish significant presence in Colorado. 
178. Although, Colorado has adopted an LLC statute that has gained some national 
influence.  See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of 
a Race Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1222–23 
(1995). 






















Colorado negatively, but may be of little relevance with regard to 
jurisdictions that are likely to experience significant out-of-state
practice.
Colorado’s approach may serve as a blueprint for the limited
nationalization of law practice: it opens the doors of a host jurisdiction to
out-of-state practitioners other than in litigation, subject only to their 
good standing, acceptance of the host’s disciplinary authority such that
the host state retains the ability to offer consumer protection to its 
citizens, and avoidance of establishing a permanent presence in the host 
jurisdiction. 
2. Open-Border Multijurisdictional Practice Subject to 
Some State Control 
Requiring an out-of-state attorney to be admitted in another United
States jurisdiction, maintain an active status, and be in good standing as 
conditions of granting the attorney permission to engage in multijurisdictional 
practice seems to be reasonably related to the legitimate state goals of 
regulating lawyers—ensuring quality and providing some measures of 
consumer protection. 
Using domicile and the establishment of a permanent office as
disqualifying factors for multijurisdictional practice, however, seems ill
advised.  These provisions seem to be in place in order to protect the
home state’s residents from attorney wrongdoing.  They are based on the 
assumption that a lawyer domiciled in a state or a lawyer with a
permanent office in a state will likely serve mostly clients from that
state.  In other words, domicile and a permanent office are used as proxy 
to identify lawyers who serve clients in a particular state.  To the extent 
that these provisions are meant to allow a state to exercise its police
power and more directly regulate lawyers who serve its residents, the 
provisions are outdated and not likely to prove effective.  Today’s
technological advances allow lawyers to be virtually present in any state 
without being there physically.  Thus, an out-of-state attorney can 
develop a practice representing nearly exclusively clients from a
jurisdiction, without establishing a domicile or opening a permanent 
office in it.  As a proxy meant to identify an attorney’s clients, domicile 
and the location of one’s permanent office are somewhat effective but 
increasingly less so.
To be sure, virtual representation has its limitations.  Law practice is 
inherently a service industry and in-person contact is in many ways an 
indispensible aspect of it, at least in some practice areas.  If the goal of
employing domicile and the location of one’s permanent office, 
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particular jurisdiction have a closer nexus to that jurisdiction, this 
legitimate objective, related to the states’ exercise of their police power,
could be achieved more effectively by adopting a registration provision 
applicable to out-of-state lawyers akin to Nevada’s Rule 5.5A.180  Such a
registration regime can then be used to quantify the extent and scope of
an attorney’s practice in the state, and states may specify certain
thresholds of practice within their borders that would trigger an obligation
to seek admission in their jurisdiction.181 
Next, Colorado’s insistence that out-of-state lawyers subject themselves 
to the regulatory power of the Colorado disciplinary agency is consistent 
with legitimate state interests.  It ensures that an out-of-state lawyer 
could be held accountable for misconduct in Colorado, without relying
on enforcement in the out-of-state lawyer’s home state, which may be
limited by the home state’s limited resources and relatively limited 
interest in enforcing discipline regarding conduct that took place outside 
of its borders.  Accepting the jurisdiction of the disciplinary agency also 
makes sense because it provides an out-of-state attorney who wishes to
enjoy the benefits of law practice in a given jurisdiction the incentive to 
accept the consequences of doing so, including the risk of discipline. 
Moreover, it seems that an out-of-state lawyer’s acceptance of the
benefits and risks of an out-of-state practice requires a stronger measure 
of accountability: a presumptive application of out-of-state discipline in
a lawyer’s home jurisdiction, including suspension and disbarment.  This
could be thought of as the consequence of engaging in a true national 
practice and would prevent an out-of-state lawyer from committing 
misconduct out of state and escaping the consequences by simply 
returning to the lawyer’s home jurisdiction or moving on to another out-
of-state jurisdiction.  Furthermore, lawyers with a national practice 
would have every incentive to comply with the host jurisdiction’s rules of 
 180. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5A (2010).  Other examples of registration
regimes include the European model pursuant to the Lawyers Establishment Directive,
see Directive 98/5/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February
1998 To Facilitate Practice of the Profession of Lawyer on a Permanent Basis in a 
Member State Other than That in which the Qualification Was Obtained, 1998 O.J. (L 
077) 36, and the ABA model rule registration of in-house counsel, see INBOUND FOREIGN 
LAWYERS, supra note 10, at 3–6. 
181. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5A. Incidentally, such a registration 
regime would allow for collection of accurate information as to the number of





    
 
    
 













    
  
     
  
 





professional conduct because failure to do so would trigger consequences 
for their ability to practice nationwide. 
Practically speaking, a rule of professional conduct could not force the 
high court of one state, traditionally charged with regulating lawyers, to
presumptively accept the discipline imposed by another state’s
high court.  Other measures, however, may achieve this result: a
multijurisdictional practice rule may condition an out-of-state attorney’s 
authority to practice in a state on the out-of-state’s lawyer’s home court
holding it would honor out-of-state discipline.  This could be
accomplished by invoking the doctrine of comity or the doctrine of 
estoppel against the disciplined attorney and justified on the ground that 
an attorney who chooses to practice out of state assumes the risk of
discipline there, as evidenced by registering to practice there.  Because
lawyers have a mandatory duty to report professional misconduct,182 an 
out-of-state attorney would be obligated to report any discipline imposed 
on the attorney out of state to the attorney’s home jurisdiction and any 
other out-of-state jurisdiction in which the attorney practices, in order to 
allow these jurisdictions to honor the discipline imposed. 
In the alternative, a national attorney database may be created logging 
disciplinary information about all lawyers licensed by any state.  Such a 
national database could be modeled (1) after the National Practitioner 
Data Bank (NPDB),183 which contains information about errant behavior
by medical professionals, and would allow states to share data about
lawyers’ misconduct; (2) after the National Discipline Data Bank run by
the ABA, which contains information concerning public discipline of 
lawyers by state bar associations and state and federal courts;184 or (3)
after state law enforcement and correctional officers databases, which
document broader categories of misconduct,185 unlike the NPDB for
medical professionals, which lists only those professionals who have 
engaged in specified significant misbehavior.186 
 182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010). 
183. The National Practitioner Data Bank was authorized under part B of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2006)). 
184. National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/databank.html (last visited Apr.
24, 2011). 
185. See generally Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer 
Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541 (2001). 
186. The reasons for reporting to the NPDB for medical professionals include loss
of state licensure or other sanctions by the state medical board, loss of staff privileges for
more than thirty days, and malpractice judgments or settlements.  42 U.S.C.
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Next, excluding litigation from the general permission to engage in 
multijurisdictional practice, although well grounded in history and 
tradition, seems antiquated and ill justified.  First, if out-of-state lawyers 
could be trusted to attain the necessary competence to practice law in a 
host state outside of the courtroom, surely they could attain the same 
necessary level of competence in the courtroom.  Second, if out-of-state
lawyers failed to attain the requisite competence, they would risk not 
only referral to the disciplinary agency in the host state but could also be 
sanctioned directly by the court, providing ample protection to host 
jurisdictions against the wasting of judicial time and resources.
Finally, states do have a legitimate interest in administering reasonable
admission standards, and as the difficulties in administering a national 
bar exam illustrate, states differ greatly in their interpretation of
“reasonable” standards.187  Indeed, host jurisdictions may have a legitimate
concern that under an open border multijurisdictional practice regime, a
“race to the bottom” will ensue with law students flocking to take the bar 
exam and seek admission in states with the lowest admission standards
and then practicing out-of-state subsequently.  To an extent, market-
based regulation may address this concern with law firms and other 
employers hiring reluctantly candidates who are admitted in “low-
admission-standards” states and subsequently seek employment out of 
state.  In addition, a multijurisdictional practice rule could grant out-of-
state lawyers permission to practice in the state subject to a requirement
of a specified period of time engaged in the practice of law actively and 
in good standing in the attorney’s home jurisdiction. 
Such an open-border approach could also address some of the
mobility challenges that have plagued regulatory enforcement.  Under 
the current state-based approach an attorney moving to a new state may
be placed in a difficult spot: because the attorney is moving to and will 
establish a permanent presence in a new state, the attorney cannot qualify
as an out-of-state attorney.  Consequently, an experienced attorney who
cannot waive into a new jurisdiction may not be able to practice for 
months until obtaining a license in the new state.  The insights of an 
open-border approach may be implemented accordingly to address this
situation.  A lawyer, admitted and in good standing in any jurisdiction, 
could be conditionally and temporarily admitted to practice in any other 
jurisdiction, as long as the lawyer (1) sits for the bar exam of the new


















state at the first possible date, (2) does not hold out to be admitted in the 
new state until the lawyer is admitted to it, and (3) accepts the rules of 
professional conduct of the new state.188  
3. Proposed Rule 5.5(a), Unauthorized Practice of Law; 
Multijurisdictional Practice of Law 
Based on the above discussion, a potential rule for the
multijurisdictional practice of law would look something like the 
following:
(a) A lawyer shall not: 
(1) practice law in this jurisdiction without a license to practice 
law issued by the [state’s highest court] unless specifically
authorized as an out-of-state attorney as defined by this
section; 
(A) An attorney who meets the following conditions is an
out-of-state attorney for the purpose of this Rule: 
(i) The attorney is licensed to practice law, has 
practiced law continuously for at least five years,
and is on active status in another jurisdiction in the 
United States; 
(ii) The attorney is a member in good standing of the 
bar of all courts and jurisdictions in which he or 
she is admitted to practice; 
(iii) The attorney is not currently subject to lawyer
discipline or the subject of pending disciplinary 
matter in any other jurisdiction;
(B) An out-of-state attorney practicing law under this Rule 
is subject to the [state] Rules of Professional Conduct
and rules of procedure regarding attorney discipline, and 
designates the clerk of the jurisdiction’s highest court 
for service of process.
(C) An out-of-state attorney practicing law under this Rule 
shall communicate to clients in this jurisdiction that the 
attorney is not licensed in this jurisdiction. 
(D) An out-of-state attorney practicing law under this Rule 
will promptly report any discipline imposed on him or 
188. A similar approach has been suggested by the ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20 pursuant to which an out-of-state lawyer who pursues admission through one of 
the procedures that a jurisdiction authorizes, such as admission by motion, in-house counsel 
registration, or passage of that jurisdiction’s bar examination, would be granted temporary 
authorization to practice law in the jurisdiction per rule 5.5(d).  See MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
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her in [this state] to the disciplinary authority in all United 
States jurisdictions where he or she is licensed to
practice.
(E) An out-of-state attorney practicing law under this Rule 
shall file an annual report, along with a reporting fee of 
$ [___], with the State Bar of [state].  The annual report 
shall encompass January 1 through December 31 of a
single calendar year, and shall be filed on or before 
January 31 of the following calendar year.  The report 
shall include the following information: 
(i) The lawyer’s residence and office address; 
(ii) The courts before which the lawyer has been
admitted to practice and the dates of admission; 
(iii) That the lawyer is currently a member in good 
standing of, and eligible to practice law before, the 
bar of those courts; 
(iv) That the lawyer is not currently on suspension or 
disbarred from the practice of law before the bar of
any court; and 
(v) The nature of the client(s) (individual or business 
entity) for whom the lawyer has provided services 
that are subject to this Rule, and the number and
general nature of the transactions performed for 
each client during the previous twelve-month 
period.  The lawyer shall not disclose the identity
of any clients or any information that is confidential 
or subject to attorney-client privilege. 
    Failure to timely file the report described in this 
paragraph may be grounds for discipline under 
[state’s] rules of professional conduct as misconduct 
and prosecution under applicable state laws.  The
failure to file a timely report shall result in the 
imposition of a fine of not more than $[___]. 
(2) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the
regulations of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; 
(3) assist a person who is not authorized to practice law
pursuant to subpart (a) of this Rule in the performance of 





















(4) allow the name of a disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer 
who must petition for reinstatement to remain in the firm 
name. 
The adoption of proposed rule 5.5(a) would necessitate corresponding 
changes to the existing subsections of current rule 5.5.  Current subsection 
5.5(b) would be deleted: subsection 5.5(b)(1) would be unnecessary
because authorized out-of-state attorneys would be allowed to establish 
an office or other systematic and continuous presence in the jurisdiction 
for the practice of law, and subsection 5.5(b)(2), forbidding an out-of-
state lawyer from holding oneself out as authorized to practice law in the
jurisdiction, would be replaced by proposed subsection 5.5(a)(1)(C),
mandating communicating to clients in the jurisdiction that one is an
out-of-state attorney not admitted in the state.   
Current subsections 5.5(c)(2) and 5.5(c)(3) would be deleted as 
unnecessary because out-of-state attorneys would be allowed to practice
law in the jurisdiction subject to new proposed rule 5.5(a).  Current 
subsections 5.5(c)(1) and 5.5(c)(4) would remain intact, allowing 
attorneys who do not meet the proposed out-of-state standards or who do
not wish to qualify as out-of-state attorneys to, respectively, continue
and temporarily associate with admitted lawyers, per 5.5(c)(1), and 
temporarily provide legal services in the jurisdiction that arise out of or
are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which 
the lawyer is admitted to practice, per 5.5(c)(4), which will be 
renumbered.  Accordingly, subsection 5.5(c) will read:
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not 
disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may
provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction 
that: 
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to
practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in
the matter;
(2) arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice
in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
Finally, current subsection 5.5(d) will remain intact. 
Proposed rule 5.5(a) would enable lawyers to serve clients on a 
national basis by allowing members of the profession in good standing 
to qualify as out-of-state attorneys in any United States jurisdiction, 
while allowing states to exercise control and discipline over such out-of-
state attorneys.  As to opponents’ two principal objections to an open-
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services provided and maintaining the integrity of local bars—the
proposal addresses both concerns.  With respect to ensuring quality, out-
of-state attorneys would only qualify to practice law in a jurisdiction if 
they were in good standing in their home jurisdiction for at least five 
years and not the subject of discipline for misconduct. 
Practically speaking, it is simply hard to see what additional quality 
controls are provided to clients by requiring lawyers in good standing to
take the bar exam in the jurisdiction.  The ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20 candidly noted that “a state may conclude that by requiring 
passage of its bar examination as a condition of admission, it weeds out 
those whose interest in the state is casual or peripheral and who have no 
commitment to the state’s administration of justice.”189  Yet the  
statement nonetheless reveals confusion and ambivalence regarding 
drawing the line between appropriate quality control measures and
acting in the profession’s self interest.  A lawyer with a national client
may very well have only a “casual or peripheral” interest in a particular 
state, not out of having “no commitment to the state’s administration of 
justice,” but rather simply because the lawyer’s national client’s interests
in the state are peripheral.  Subjecting such a lawyer to the state’s bar 
examination as a condition precedent for practicing law in the 
jurisdiction would not only contradict current practice realities but could
also create a reasonable impression that the profession is more
concerned with its own self-interest than it is with genuinely protecting
the public from lawyer abuse and incompetence.
Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that pursuant to rule 5.5(a) all 
out-of-state attorneys will be subject to rule 1.1 ensuring competence.190 
Comment 2 to rule 1.1 instructively states that: “A lawyer need not
necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long 
experience.”191  Just as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct trust
lawyers to acquire the necessary expertise to handle any case and, in 
particular, trust new attorneys to develop the necessary skill and 
expertise by appropriate preparation, so should the rules expect out-of-
state lawyers to master any jurisdiction’s laws or risk facing discipline.
189. ADMISSION BY MOTION, supra note 10, at 6. 
190. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010). 
191. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2. 
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Incidentally, by relying on rule 1.1 to ensure the competence of out-of-
state attorneys, proposed rule 5.5(a) avoids the misstep by the
Restatement, which inadvertently suggests a separate standard of 
competence for out-of-state attorneys.192 
In addition, jurisdictions legitimately concerned with providing their 
residents additional measures of quality control can do so by adding an 
appropriate legal education requirement to proposed rule 5.5(a).  For 
example, borrowing from the ABA Model Rule on Admission by
Motion,193 proposed rule 5.5(a)(1)(A) could add a fourth requirement 
(iv) specifying that an out-of-state lawyer must hold a first professional
degree in law—J.D. or LL.B.—from a law school approved by an
appropriate accrediting agency, for example, from the Council of the 
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA. 
Next, proposed rule 5.5(a) would allow lawyers with subject-matter 
expertise to offer legal services on a national basis, allowing clients
nationwide to benefit from their expertise irrespective of state borders. 
And proposed subsection 5.5(a)(1)(C), mandating communications 
between out-of-state attorneys and clients regarding the lawyer’s status,
would allow clients to make informed decisions about the lawyer’s
quality and qualifications.194 
Moreover, not only would states’ legitimate interest in ensuring the
quality of legal services provided to their residents be maintained, but 
clients would likely benefit from lower costs as the result of both 
increased competition in the market for legal services and savings from 
not having to pay for separate local counsel.   
With respect to states’ legitimate interest in protecting the valuable 
contributions of local bars, local attorneys would continue to have 
comparative advantages compared with out-of-state attorneys.  Local
lawyers would be able to offer in-person representation, offer a high 
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. e (2000). 
The Restatement states that out-of-state lawyers providing legal advice in a jurisdiction
should do so only when they have “adequate familiarity” with the jurisdiction’s laws, 
deviating from rule 1.1’s standard of competence.  Id.; see also text accompanying note 
72.  
193. See ADMISSION BY MOTION, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
194. Current comment 20 to rule 5.5 states: 
In some circumstances, a lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant 
to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the lawyer is not 
licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction.  For example, that may be required 
when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires
knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 20 (2010) (emphasis added).  Comment
20 reflects what I have elsewhere described as the profession’s tendency to not take 
clients seriously by failing to mandate communications of material information to clients. See
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level of expertise concerning state laws, and relative superior level of 
knowledge of relevant state and regional level culture, politics, and legal 
landscape.195  In fact, the failure of franchise law firms to expand greatly 
in recent years196 suggests that fears about the rise of Walmart-style
giant providers of legal services that would crowd out local lawyers may
have been exaggerated.    
IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROFESSION 
Colorado’s open-border approach is silent with regard to foreign 
lawyers’ ability to practice in the jurisdiction,197 leaving unaddressed the
issue of the globalization of law practice.  Yet because the American legal 
profession is beginning to experience global competition for the provision 
of legal services and is reconsidering its position about admission standards
for foreign attorneys,198 Colorado’s and proposed rule 5.5(a)’s approaches
are nonetheless instructive with regard to identifying some of the relevant 
considerations for applying open borders globally.
Proposed rule 5.5(a)’s requirement that an out-of-state attorney be 
licensed in another United States jurisdiction implicitly assumes and 
relies on American legal education in an accredited law school and thus,
implicitly, proficiency in the English language and a bar admission
process that includes an American bar examination and application
procedure.  Similarly, proposed 5.5(a)’s requirement that an out-of-state 
195. To some extent, proposed section 5.5(a)(1)(C), mandating communicating to 
clients one’s status as an out-of-state attorney, although intended to provide clients with
relevant material information to allow them to exercise informed judgment regarding legal
services consumed, would benefit local lawyers because some clients may draw an
inference that out-of-state lawyers are not as knowledgeable about the state’s laws as 
local attorneys are.
196. Carle, supra note 27, at 723; see also supra note 27. 
 197. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2010).  Notably, Virginia’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct define an out-of-state attorney to include foreign lawyers.  VA. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(1) (2010). 
198. See, e.g., INBOUND FOREIGN LAWYERS, supra note 10 (discussing the ability of
foreign lawyers to practice law in the United States).  Currently, thirteen states permit pro hac
vice admission by foreign lawyers, see Am. Bar Ass’n, Center for Prof’l Responsibility, 
Joint Comm. on Lawyer Regulation, Comparison of ABA Model Rule for Pro Hac Vice 
Admission with State Versions and Amendments Since August 2002 (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/prohac_admin_comp.authc 
heckdam.pdf; see also Peter D. Ehrenhaft, A 21st Century Model Rule for Temporary 
Practice of Foreign Lawyers, INT’L L. NEWS, Winter 2011, at 11 (questioning the prudence 

















    
 
 
     
  
 
      
  
      







   
 
attorney be in good standing implies reliance on American-styled 
regulatory and disciplinary approaches. 
These assumptions, however, are increasingly being challenged. 
Foreign LL.M. students and some common law foreign attorneys can
qualify to take the New York and California bar exams and could, upon 
obtaining a New York or a California license, qualify as out-of-state
lawyers in Colorado without meeting some of these assumptions. 
Historically, elite American law schools offering LL.M. programs have 
attracted students with strong credentials who, for example, evidenced
strong English-language skills.199  But LL.M. students only spend a year
in an American law school and lawyers from common law countries not 
even that.  Indeed, as American law schools extend their global reach by 
offering executive LL.M. programs over one summer,200 a Colorado-
based approach could not even assume a year-long exposure to 
American legal education.201 
The open-border approaches adopted in Colorado and proposed rule 
5.5(a) therefore raise questions about the qualifications out-of-state 
lawyers, including foreign attorneys, should possess.  What is the 
inherent importance, if any, of American legal education as a condition 
precedent for the practice of law in the United States?  Does the special
role of law and lawyers in the United States necessitate some special
training and immersion in American culture?  What is the inherent 
importance, if any, of proficiency in English as a condition precedent
for the practice of law?  On the one hand, effective attorney-client
communications seem to require some assurances regarding ability to 
communicate.  On the other hand, language is but one important
consideration regarding effective communications.  Foreign lawyers may
be in some circumstances better able to communicate with some
American clients, for example, given their proficiency in Spanish or as
well positioned to bridge class, socioeconomic, and status gaps.202 
199. See Carole Silver, Internationalizing U.S. Legal Education: A Report on the 
Education of Transnational Lawyers, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 157–58 
(2006); Carole Silver & Mayer Freed, Translating the U.S. LLM Experience: The Need
for a Comprehensive Examination, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 23, 23–24 (2006), http:// 
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/3/LRColl2006n3Silver-Freed.pdf. 
200. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Berkeley To Offer Two-Summer LL.M. Program 
for International Students, A.B.A. J. (June 13, 2008, 9:19 AM), http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/berkeley_to_offer_two_summer_llm_program_for_international_students/.
201. Concerns regarding foreign lawyers’ legal education could be addressed by
requiring out-of-state attorneys to hold an accredited law degree.  See supra note 193 and 
accompanying text.
202. See Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender 
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2245, 2247–48 (2010) (exploring the question of who is qualified and entitled to 
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Moreover, one basic theme of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
is to require disclosure and competence, not impose paternalistic 
requirements.203  Arguably, as long as clients are well informed about
the risks inherent in communicating and dealing with foreign attorneys, 
clients should be entitled to be represented by the lawyer of their choice. 
To be clear, the point is not that states should readily allow foreign 
lawyers to practice law in their jurisdictions without adequately
protecting their residents from abuse and without taking appropriate 
measures to ensure the quality of services provided by foreign attorneys. 
Certainly, states should demand assurances regarding a foreign lawyer’s
basic capacity to effectively communicate with clients the foreign 
lawyer’s quality of legal studies and competence.  Proposed rule 5.5(a) 
does, however, challenge traditional assumptions and conventions about 
quality and competence, as well as about who should regulate and assess 
these qualifications, opening the door to a much needed debate about 
whether and how to allow foreign lawyers to provide legal services to 
American clients.204 
Proposed rule 5.5(a)’s approach to disciplinary enforcement is also 
instructive regarding applying an open-border approach to foreign 
lawyers.  Requiring out-of-state lawyers to submit to the jurisdiction’s 
rules of professional conduct205 assumes that such a condition is
sufficient to protect a jurisdiction’s clients from attorney abuse.  Once an
out-of-state attorney submits to discipline in the jurisdiction, clients 
should have some recourse and the disciplinary authority some measures 
of deterring and punishing misconduct.  Similarly, the proposed rule 
5.5(a)’s approach assumes implicitly that judgments in the jurisdiction 
might be relatively easily enforced against out-of-state attorneys and that 
the its registration requirements might provide reputational disincentive 
for out-of-state attorneys to engage in wrongdoing.206 
These assumptions may not hold with regard to foreign attorneys.  A
foreign lawyer’s acceptance of a state’s disciplinary rules may have little 
practical effect on the state’s ability to enforce discipline when appropriate.
A United States jurisdiction may not expect foreign jurisdictions to 
203. See Wald, supra note 90, at 773–75. 
204. See ADMISSION BY MOTION, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
205. See supra Part III.C.3.  For the specific section of the proposed rule, see 
section 5.5(a)(1)(B) in Part III.C.3. 
206. See supra Part III.C.3.  For the specific section of the proposed rule, see 




















honor and enforce its discipline, and the reputational effects of 
American-imposed discipline on foreign lawyers may vary greatly.  One 
possible solution might be to require foreign attorneys to acquire and
show proof of malpractice liability coverage as a condition precedent to
obtaining a license to practice in the United States.207 
V. CONCLUSION
The nationalization of law practice is a significant contemporary 
development, and globalization of law practice is likely soon to follow.
The natural and obvious regulatory solution to nationalization and
globalization of law practice is the nationalization, and perhaps down the 
road the globalization, of the regulatory approach to law practice.  Yet as
some aspects of establishing a national regulatory approach to law 
practice remain underexplored, an intermediary solution allowing national
law practice while maintaining significant state involvement in admissions,
licensing, and disciplinary enforcement seems most appropriate. 
In Federalizing Legal Ethics Professor Zacharias argued for one such 
intermediary approach—the nationalization, by federalization, of legal 
ethics rules.  This Article establishes, however, that nationalizing, or 
federalizing, legal ethics rules alone would not address the most
significant consequences of the mismatch between a national law
practice and a state-based regulatory approach—the problem of the 
unauthorized practice of law.  The Article instead advocates an alternative 
intermediary approach: an open border permission to practice subject to
continued state control over admission, licensing, and disciplinary 
enforcement.
207. Wald, supra note 90, at 792–97 (summarizing the debate regarding requiring 
mandatory disclosure of malpractice coverage as a condition precedent for law practice).
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